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 I. INTRODUCTION 
For most of human history, the rape and sexual abuse of women 
associated with the enemy was an expected spoil, inevitable by-product, or 
legitimate tactic of war.  Where gender violence was condemned, 
humanitarian law—which primarily reflected the male experience with 
armed conflict—conceptualized such conduct as an offense against a 
woman’s dignity or a family’s honor.1  Thanks to the tireless work of 
committed advocates, jurists, and diplomats,2 international law now treats 
gender violence3 as a prosecutable crime against the physical and mental 
                                                           
 1. See INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
THE FIELD 17, 18 (Francis Lieber ed., Washington, Government Printing Office 1898) 
(1863), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Instructions-gov-
armies.pdf.  The instructions state that  
[c]rimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, 
assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if 
committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants, 
are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death is not 
inflicted, the severer punishment shall be preferred. 
Id.  These instructions, commonly called the Lieber Code, governed the Union forces 
during the United States Civil War and represent one of the first efforts to codify the 
laws of war and designate rape as a war crime.  See id.  Subsequent codification efforts 
did not follow this lead.  The regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention on 
Land Warfare (IV) euphemistically indicated that “family honour and rights . . . must 
be respected.”  See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.  Even the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions promulgated after World War II do not expressly categorize rape and 
other acts of sexual violence as “grave breaches” of the treaties giving rise to a duty of 
state parties to prosecute such crimes pursuant to principles of universal jurisdiction.  
See id. art. 146-47.  Rather, such acts are specifically prohibited elsewhere in the 
treaties in provisions that give rise only to state responsibility.  See id. art. 27.  For 
example, Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that women shall be 
protected against “any attack on their honor, in particular rape, enforced prostitution, or 
any form of sexual assault.”  Id.  The grave breaches regime does penalize a number of 
violent acts, including torture, inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering 
or serious injury to body or health, that easily encompass acts of rape and other sexual 
violence.  See id. art. 147.  Even the statute of the ad hoc criminal tribunal for 
Yugoslavia did not enumerate acts of sexual violence as war crimes, although rape was 
listed as a crime against humanity.  See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 
arts. 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. The Rwanda 
Tribunal’s Statute did enumerate rape, enforced prostitution, and other forms of 
indecent assault as war crimes by virtue of its reproduction of Protocol II of the Geneva 
Conventions governing non-international armed conflicts. See Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2-3, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts art. 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].  As 
discussed more fully below, the ad hoc international tribunals have issued important 
rulings recognizing the existence of multiple crimes of sexual violence under 
customary international law. 
 2. See Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender 
Crimes Under the International Criminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFFAIRS 65, 66-
69 (1999) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the negotiations surrounding the 
gender provisions within the Rome Statute). 
 3. This Article will generally employ the term “gender violence” to refer to 
violence committed on the basis of a person’s sex or gender.  Although much gender 
violence is sexual violence, the latter term excludes acts of persecution that are not 
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integrity of the victim.  Indeed, with the promulgation of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
criminal tribunals, there is now strong law on the books enabling gender 
crimes to be prosecuted as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the 
predicate acts of genocide.4 
Notwithstanding that such conduct is finally clearly unlawful under 
international criminal law, the security of women in situations of armed 
conflict or mass repression is little improved and in fact may have 
worsened.5  Indeed, violence against women continues to be employed as a 
deliberate “tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse 
and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group,” 
as noted by Security Council Resolution 1820.6  Even where such acts are 
not the result of an express governmental or group policy, gender violence 
is regularly tolerated by authorities as a way to reward or re-energize 
exhausted fighters and further terrorize, punish, or humiliate an enemy 
community.  Violence against women thus remains inherent to situations of 
lawlessness as a cruel extension of the pervasive gender subordination 
already endemic worldwide in times of relative peace and security.  In 
connection with the passage of Resolution 1820, Major General Patrick 
Cammaert, a former U.N. peacekeeping commander, testified before the 
Security Council that “[i]t has probably become more dangerous to be a 
woman than a soldier in an armed conflict.”7 
Although the substantive law concerned with gender violence is now 
                                                           
sexual in nature but that are still based upon sex or gender discrimination.  Accord 
HEALTH & CMTY. DEV. SECTION, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HOW TO GUIDE: 
SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE PROGRAMME IN LIBERIA 7-8 (2001), available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3c4d6af24.pdf (defining “sexual violence” and 
“gender-based violence”). 
 4. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5(1)(g), U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (granting the ICC 
jurisdiction to prosecute rape and other forms of sexual violence as crimes against 
humanity when such crimes are “committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population”). 
 5. See Avril McDonald, The Year in Review, 1 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 
113, 123 (1998) (noting that ninety percent of victims of today’s armed conflicts are 
civilians, with women constituting a disproportionate number of civilian victims); see 
also Mary Deutsch Schneider, About Women, War and Darfur: The Continuing Quest 
for Gender Violence Justice, 83 N.D. L. REV. 915, 915-20 (2007) (citing statistics and 
examples that illustrate women’s increased victimization in armed conflict and noting 
that while male civilians are killed, female civilians are often raped then killed). 
 6. See S.C. Res. 1820, intro., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008) (recognizing 
sexual violence as an issue of international security that impedes the establishment of a 
durable peace).  Resolution 1820 follows on the heels of Resolution 1325, which 
considered the many ways in which conflict affects women and children, recognized 
women’s role in preventing and resolving conflict, called for equal participation and 
full involvement of women in efforts to maintain peace and security, and advocated a 
gender perspective in peacekeeping.  See S.C. Res. 1325, ¶¶ 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1325 
(Oct. 31, 2000). 
 7. See Transcript of Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and 
Security (June 19, 2008), http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/Open_Debates/Sexual 
_Violence08/Cammaert.MONUC.pdf (promoting the inclusion of female military and 
police personnel in U.N. peacekeeping missions to more effectively address the 
increasing victimization of women and girls). 
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well established, and the principle of legality can no longer serve as a 
barrier to prosecutions for gender violence, significant obstacles remain to 
ensuring a robust system of gender justice in international criminal law in 
the face of continued violations.8  These obstacles are less visible than 
defects in positive law because they emerge in the practice of international 
criminal law at crucial yet shrouded stages of the penal process: 
investigation, charging, pre-trial plea negotiations, trial preparation, the 
provision of protective measures, and appeals.9  Most importantly, strong 
positive law is irrelevant where a commitment to gender justice does not 
infuse all stages of the development and implementation of a prosecutorial 
strategy.10 
The track record of gender justice before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) provides a forceful object lesson for 
prosecutors practicing before the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
other international criminal law tribunals into the ways in which crimes of 
sexual violence can be poorly or under-prosecuted and thus rendered 
invisible and un-redressed.11  Although gender violence in Rwanda did not 
receive the levels of media attention focused on similar crimes committed 
in the former Yugoslavia, the Rwandan statistics—inherently 
approximate—are stunning.  Estimates range from 250,000 to 500,000 
rapes during the short period of the genocide, from April to June 1994.12  
Rape in Rwanda was also accompanied by sexual mutilation and torture, 
and women and girls were often literally raped to death by perpetrators 
wielding machetes, sharpened sticks, broken bottles, and other 
                                                           
 8. See JUDITH G. GARDAM & MICHELLE J. JARVIS, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 (2001) (recognizing the inclusion of gender violence and 
armed conflict in international law, but maintaining that criminal punishment does not 
prevent atrocities and further noting the lack of implemented legal norms to regulate 
gender violence). 
 9. For a discussion of the appellate process before the ICTR as it relates to gender 
crimes, see Patricia V. Sellers, The “Appeal” of Sexual Violence: Akayesu/Gacumbitsi 
Cases, in Center for Human Rights, GENDER BASED VIOLENCE IN AFRICA: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE CONTINENT 51, available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_ 
publications/gender/Gender-based%20violence%20in%20Africa.pdf. 
 10. See Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related 
Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288, 317 (2003) (noting that investigation, indictment, and 
prosecution for gender crimes in the Rwanda and Yugoslav Tribunals occurred only 
after widespread lobbying by women’s rights organizations and feminist scholars). 
 11. See Stephanie K. Wood, A Woman Scorned for the “Least Condemned” War 
Crime: Precedent and Problems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious Crime in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 274, 299-301 
(2004) (explaining that the ICTR initially failed to indict perpetrators for sexual crimes, 
inadequately addressed the tension between legal justice and survivor interests, and 
delayed arresting and prosecuting perpetrators of rape warfare); Sellers, supra note 9, at 
60 (noting the when cases are improperly investigated or processed, it “re-enforces the 
invisibility of the crimes and the invisibility of the mainly female victims or survivors 
of the sexual violence”). 
 12. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, 
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68 
(Jan. 29, 1996) (discussing the methodology and difficulties in estimating the number 
of rapes during hostilities); see also Wood, supra note 11, at 285-86 (citing these 
statistics and noting the likelihood of under-reporting). 
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implements.13  By some accounts, virtually all female survivors—including 
very young girls—in Rwanda were raped or sexually assaulted during the 
100 days of the genocide.14 
Yet, the results of the cases before the ICTR do not reflect the high 
levels of gender violence in Rwanda during the genocide.15  In fact, the 
systemic lack of gender violence charges, and the high number of acquittals 
for the charges that were brought, generates the opposite impression.  This 
disconnect lies at the heart of this paper, which will discuss the many ways 
in which gender justice can be neglected or sidelined in international 
criminal law with a particular focus on the history of gender justice 
prosecutions before the ICTR and the decisions and practices of that 
Tribunal’s Office of the Prosecutor.  This study makes clear that where 
gender violence is not central to a prosecutorial strategy, potential charges 
become dispensable and charged crimes result in acquittals when subjected 
to the adversarial criminal justice process.  Although it is largely too late 
for the women of Rwanda, the ICC—whose constitutive statute contains 
groundbreaking and enlightened structural, procedural, and substantive 
provisions to ensure gender justice—must generate better results for 
women victims elsewhere and ensure that the missteps, carelessness, and 
neglect characterizing gender justice before the ICTR are not repeated. 
II. PREVENTING SELECTIVE JUSTICE 
Before commencing investigations and drafting indictments, a 
prosecutor must devise and continue to develop a coherent strategy for how 
crimes of sexual violence in the relevant region are to be investigated, 
charged, prosecuted, proven, and appealed in the face of acquittals.  This 
requires a thorough knowledge of the applicable substantive law and the 
way in which gender violence manifested itself within the region in 
question.  Although this process is facilitated and enhanced by the 
                                                           
 13. See BINAIFER NOWROJEE, U.N. RESEARCH INST. FOR SOC. DEV., “YOUR JUSTICE 
IS TOO SLOW”: WILL THE ICTR FAIL RWANDA’S RAPE VICTIMS? 1 (2005) (quoting 
ICTR testimony regarding the atrocities perpetrated against women in Rwanda).  Major 
Brent Beardsley, the assistant to Major-General Roméo Dallaire, force commander of 
the U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda, was once asked before the ICTR to describe 
the female corpses he saw.  He responded: 
when they killed women it appeared that the blows that had killed them were 
aimed at sexual organs, either breasts or vagina; they had been deliberately 
swiped or slashed in those areas . . . .  [G]irls as young as six, seven years of 
age, their vaginas would be split and swollen from obviously multiple gang 
rape, and they would have been killed in that position. 
Id. 
 14. See AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIANCE (1995) (first 
NGO account of the extent of the genocide in Rwanda); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 24 (1996) (noting that the exact number of gender-based crimes 
perpetrated during the genocide is unknowable). 
 15. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 3 (explaining that, as of May 2004, the 
Prosecutor’s Office did not bring rape charges in seventy percent of ICTR cases and 
that there is only a ten percent conviction rate in the cases in which rape charges were 
brought). 
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appointment of an on-site gender expert with the appropriate rank and 
seniority to be effective,16 any gender violence policy must be fully 
institutionalized and operationalized such that it infuses the hiring, training, 
day-to-day activities, and evaluation of all prosecutorial staff.  Any gender 
violence prosecutorial strategy must also include the appointment of 
women and gender experts to positions of influence and to posts that 
require contact with female victims.17  Such a policy must be continually 
monitored to ensure that different investigative and trial teams are 
prosecuting gender violence consistently over time.18 
Although there have been setbacks in gender justice before all the ad hoc 
tribunals19 and during all phases of the ICTR’s work,20 critiques by 
advocates of gender justice tend to focus on the tenure of Swiss jurist Carla 
                                                           
 16. No gender advisor within the ICTY or ICTR had a U.N. rank higher than P-4, 
which excluded them from high-level policy discussions. 
 17. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 90 (reporting that victims 
indicated they would only discuss sexual violence with a female investigator); see also 
Wood, supra note 11, at 305-06 (noting that the ICTR had fewer women personnel 
than other tribunals and that this likely undermined the tribunal’s ability to indict for 
sex crimes). 
 18. See Valerie Oosterveld, Gender-Sensitive Justice and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Lessons Learned for the International Criminal Court, 
12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119, 127 (2005) (explaining that inconsistent policies 
result in improper gathering of evidence, missed opportunities for furthering 
investigations, improper methodological practices, and failed prosecutions); Letter 
from Human Rights Watch to U.N. Security Council Members, Rwanda and the 
Security Council: Changing the International Tribunal (Aug. 1, 2003), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/08/01/rwanda-and-security-council-changing-
international-tribunal (noting decline in attention to and indictments for gender crimes); 
see also Gaëlle Breton-LeGoff, Analysis of Trends in Sexual Violence Prosecutions in 
Indictments by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) from November 
1995 to November 2002, Nov. 28, 2002, http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/ 
advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/analysisoftrends_en.php (noting 
that the prosecution of sexual violence in the ICTR increased between 1998 and 2001, 
but subsequently decreased). 
 19. See LaShawn R. Jefferson, In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s 
Status, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 325, 337 (2004), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf (stating that “both [the ICTR 
and the ICTY] have been plagued by weak investigations and neither has had an 
effective long-term prosecution strategy that acknowledges the degree of wartime 
sexual violence suffered by women”). 
 20. See The Secretary-General, Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in 
the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994: 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services, Annex: Summary, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/789 
(Feb. 6, 1997) (discussing administrative, leadership, and operational shortcomings of 
the tribunal and expressing concern about its ability to administer justice in Rwanda).  
The ICTR took considerable time to reach its stride in the face of allegations of 
nepotism, corruption, and incompetence on all fronts, not just with respect to the 
prosecution of gender violence.  See id. (reporting that “serious operational deficiencies 
in the [m]anagement of the Tribunal . . . developed virtually from its inception”).  In 
addition, the relentless Completion Strategy mandated by the U.N. Security Council 
undoubtedly has weighed against the expansion of current proceedings in any fashion.  
See S.C. Res. 1503, ¶¶ 3-7, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (initiating 
completion strategy and calling upon the ICTR to complete its work by 2010). 
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Del Ponte as ICTR Chief Prosecutor (1999-2003).21  Overall, it appears that 
Del Ponte and her staff in Rwanda proceeded without a coherent strategy 
for investigating sexual violence or a theory of how sexual violence fit into 
the way in which genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity were 
committed in Rwanda.  As a result, during much of this time, the 
prosecutor’s office neglected, de-emphasized, or at times botched the 
prosecution of crimes of sexual violence committed in Rwanda.22  A 2003 
letter to Del Ponte from one NGO dedicated to ensuring that the ICTR 
protects the rights and interests of Rwandan women memorialized these 
concerns: “we believe that your four-year record as ICTR prosecutor shows 
no concrete commitment to effectively developing evidence to bring such 
charges, despite the longstanding and overwhelming proof of sexual 
violence during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.”23  Several policies and 
practices of the Office of the Prosecutor are specifically singled out for 
criticism as discussed more fully below. 
A. The Investigation Stage 
Since a prosecutor can only charge those crimes of which he or she is 
                                                           
 21. See, e.g., NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 8 (noting a particular lack of political 
will to prosecute sexual violence during Del Ponte’s tenure).  As originally conceived, 
the ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda shared a Chief Prosecutor, 
who was located in The Hague.  Justice Richard Goldstone (South Africa) first 
occupied this post starting in 1994.  See id. at 9.  In 1996, he was replaced by Canadian 
jurist Louise Arbour, who served until 1999, when Swiss former prosecutor Carla Del 
Ponte next occupied the position. See id. at 9-10.  In 2003, as part of the Completion 
Strategy devised for the two ad hoc tribunals, the Security Council appointed Hassan 
Bubacar Jallow of Gambia as Chief Prosecutor for the ICTR, over Del Ponte’s 
objection. See id. at 11; see also S.C. Res. 1503, Annex I, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1503/Annex I (Aug. 28, 2003) (granting the Secretary-General the authority to 
nominate the tribunal prosecutor).  When Del Ponte stepped down from the ICTY, 
Belgian prosecutor Serge Brammertz assumed the ICTY position effective January 1, 
2008.  See Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Statement of Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor of the ICTY (Jan. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2008/pr1212e.htm (accepting appointment as 
Prosecutor). 
 22. See, e.g., NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 8-19 (detailing multiple defects in the 
prosecutorial strategy before the ICTR, including a lack of political will to prosecute 
gender violence, poor investigations, prosecuting with inadequate evidence, and failure 
to file timely appeals after rape acquittals). 
 23. Letter from Ariane Brunet, Coordinator for Women’s Rights, Rights & 
Democracy, on behalf of the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict 
Situations, to Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(Mar. 12, 2003), available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacy 
Dossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/lettertoprosecutor_en.php.  The Coalition 
expressed similar concerns in a letter to then Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
Kofi Annan, who was at the time considering Del Ponte’s renewal.  See Letter from 
Ariane Brunet, Coordinator for Women’s Rights, Rights & Democracy, on behalf of 
the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, to Kofi Annan, U.N. 
Secretary General (July 24, 2003), available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/ 
site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/lettrekofiannan_en.php.   
  Several days later, Annan announced the bifurcation of the Chief Prosecutor 
position and appointed Jallow as the Chief Prosecutor dedicated to Rwanda.  See “New 
Rwanda Prosecutor Named,” BBC NEWS, Aug. 29, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/africa/3190833.stm (last visited May 21, 2009) (describing Del Ponte’s clashes 
with the Rwandan government, leading up to the Jallow appointment). 
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aware and that are supported by sufficient admissible and probative 
evidence, a thorough and effective investigation at the inception of a case is 
crucial to ensuring that gender crimes are fully and successfully 
prosecuted.24  Prosecutors and investigators must coordinate to ensure that 
the latter are gathering the evidence upon which the former can build 
accurate and comprehensive indictments.25  Having a coherent strategy for 
prosecuting gender crimes is especially important as crimes with a sexual 
component may be more difficult to investigate.26  In particular, locating 
physical, documentary, and testimonial evidence that proves the 
commission of sexual violence may present unique challenges27 as 
compared to other crimes of violence that may be more visible or publicly 
documented.28  Victims of sexual violence, both male and female, are often 
initially unwilling to come forward to testify about such acts, and 
investigators may be reluctant to pressure witnesses to reveal the full scope 
of the harm suffered.29  In addition, there is a common perception that 
women from patriarchal or traditional societies will simply not talk about 
being sexually assaulted.30  Experience shows, however, that proper 
investigative methodologies, utilized by sensitive and dedicated staff 
members and support persons, can elicit valuable testimony and empower 
women to participate effectively in prosecutions.31 
                                                           
 24. See Stephanie N. Sackellares, From Bosnia to Sudan: Sexual Violence in 
Modern Armed Conflict, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 155-56 (2005) (discussing 
methods for improving future prosecutions for mass atrocities, such as those currently 
occurring in Sudan). 
 25. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 12 (explaining that investigators in Kigali, 
Rwanda, often gathered witness statements of only a few paragraphs that were of little 
assistance to prosecutors).  This coordination was hampered within the ICTR by the 
fact that many investigators were located in Kigali, Rwanda, whereas the prosecutors 
were more often in Arusha, Tanzania, where the Tribunal is located.  See id. 
 26. See Alex Obote-Odora, Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR 
Contribution, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 135, 156-57 (2005) (explaining that 
the highly sensitive and traumatizing nature of sexual violence paired with Rwandan 
women’s shyness and hesitance to discuss their experiences render investigations 
difficult). 
 27. See id. at 140 (observing that “[s]ex-based crimes are not easily identifiable, 
like gunshot wounds or amputated limbs.  This is because these crimes inflict physical 
and psychological wounds, which women can conceal to avoid further emotional 
anguish, ostracism, and retaliation from perpetrators who may live nearby.”). 
 28. See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Annex to the “Paper on Some Policy Issues 
Before the Office of the Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications 1 (Sept. 2003) 
(noting that the ease of investigation is a factor that is taken into account when deciding 
on which situations to focus). 
 29. Binaifer Nowrojee, We Can Do Better: Investigating and Prosecuting 
International Crimes of Sexual Violence (2004), http://www.womensrights 
coalition.org/site/publications/papers/doBetter_en.php (noting that many investigators 
are not specifically trained to elicit sensitive information from rape victims, and further 
highlighting that many victims fail to come forward due to fear of rejection and 
stigmatization). 
 30. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 9 n.8 (recounting an interview with ICTR 
deputy prosecutor, who was quoted as saying, “African women don’t want to talk about 
rape . . . .  We haven’t received any real complaints.  It’s rare in investigations that 
women refer to rape.”). 
 31. See Nowrojee, supra note 29 (highlighting the effective use of an integrated 
prosecutorial strategy, female investigators, and a sensitive interviewing methodology 
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In several early ICTR cases, evidence about uncharged acts of sexual 
violence emerged during trial through unsolicited witness testimony.  The 
Akayesu case provides the most famous example.32  There, two trial 
witnesses gave testimony that they had been raped or that they had 
witnessed the rape of others in Jean-Paul Akayesu’s commune.33  One 
victim testified that she had never been asked about rape by tribunal 
investigators.34  Learning of this testimony, the Coalition for Women’s 
Human Rights in Conflict Situations (Coalition)35 submitted an amicus 
curiae brief on behalf of over forty other NGOs and law clinics urging the 
Trial Chamber to invite the prosecutor to amend Akayesu’s indictment to 
charge rape as a war crime, a crime against humanity, and an act of 
genocide.36  After continuing the trial to permit the prosecution to prepare 
an amended indictment and the defense to meet the new charges,37 the 
                                                           
for prosecuting sexual violence before the U.N. Special Court for Sierra Leone). 
 32. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶¶ 416-417 (Sept. 2, 1998) (stating that “allegations of sexual violence first came to the 
attention of the Chamber” when two witnesses were being examined, and noting that 
the indictment was subsequently amended to include knowledge and facilitation of 
sexual violence). 
 33. See id. ¶¶ 416, 421. 
 34. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript, at pp. 00101-00102 
(Jan. 27, 1997) (testimony of Witness J). 
 35. See Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, 
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/main_en.php (last visited May. 21, 2009) 
(explaining that the Coalition goals are “to promote the adequate prosecution of 
perpetrators of gender violence in transitional justice systems based in Africa, in order 
to create precedents that recognise violence against women in conflict situations [and 
to] help find ways to obtain justice for women survivors of sexual violence”). 
 36. Brief for Al-Haq et al. as Amici Curiae Respecting Amendment of the 
Indictment and Supplementation of the Evidence to Ensure the Prosecution of Rape 
and Other Sexual Violence within the Competence of the Tribunal, ¶ 3, Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org 
/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/Akayesu/amicusbrief_en.php. 
 37. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 417 (noting 
amendment of indictment in light of the testimony of Witnesses H and J).  In the 
process of amending the indictment, both the Trial Chamber and the prosecution denied 
that they were responding directly to the amicus brief.  See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript, at p. 8 (June 17, 1997).  Pierre Prosper said for the 
prosecution:  
I would like to say to this Chamber right now and make it perfectly clear that 
the amicus curiae is not motivating us today.  It is not motivating us today and, 
in fact, it can only be considered as a factor.  And I say this is a factor because 
what it does is it reminds us of the importance of the issue of sexual violence. 
Id.  Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber acknowledged the brief in its judgment.  See 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 417. 
The Chamber understands that the amendment of the indictment resulted from 
the spontaneous testimony of sexual violence by witness J and H during the 
course of this trial and the subsequent investigation of the prosecution, rather 
than from public pressure.  Nevertheless, the Chamber takes note of the 
interest shown in this issue by non-governmental organizations, which it 
considers as indicative of public concern over the historical exclusion of rape 
and other forms of sexual violence from the investigation and prosecution of 
war crimes. 
Id. 
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ICTR convicted Akayesu of aiding and abetting38 crimes against humanity 
and genocide for acts of rape that took place in the vicinity of his office.39  
In this landmark ruling, which signifies the high water mark for gender 
justice before the ICTR, the Chamber defined rape and sexual violence 
under international law for the first time in history.40  Similar 
amendments41 were allowed in some subsequent cases.42 
                                                           
 38. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 694-697 
(finding Akayesu criminally responsible under Articles 3(g), 3(i), and 6(1) of the Rome 
Statute for multiple acts of gender-based violence, including rape).  Specifically, the 
Chamber held that Akayesu was responsible for these acts “by allowing them to take 
place on or near the premises of the bureau communal and by facilitating the 
commission of such sexual violence through his words of encouragement in other acts 
of sexual violence which, by virtue of his authority, sent a clear signal of official 
tolerance for sexual violence, without which these acts would not have taken place.”  
Id. ¶ 694.  The Chamber disregarded the evidence in the record concerned with sexual 
assaults committed outside the bureau communal on the ground that the indictment 
alleged only Akayesu’s responsibility for acts “on or near” the compound. See id. 
¶ 689. 
 39. Akayesu was acquitted on the war crimes counts, charged as outrages upon 
dignity under Protocol II of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, based on the Trial 
Chamber’s ruling that the prosecutor had failed to demonstrate that the events in Taba 
Commune were sufficiently connected to the armed conflict between the Rwandan 
government and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) being fought elsewhere 
in the country.  See id. ¶¶ 640, 643.  The prosecution had evidence that Akayesu wore a 
military jacket, carried a weapon, and assisted the members of the military upon their 
arrival in Taba Commune.  However, this was deemed insufficient to trigger the 
applicability of the war crimes prohibitions in the ICTR Statute.  See id. ¶¶ 641-644.  
The prosecution successfully appealed the legal standard the Trial Chamber employed 
when it held that the defendant must be shown to be a commander, combatant, or other 
member of the armed forces to be guilty of war crimes; however, the Appeals Chamber 
left the verdict on the war crimes counts untouched.  See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case 
No. ICTR 96-4-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment, ¶ 445 (June 1, 2001) (finding that the 
Trial Chamber erred in “restricting the application of common Article 3 to a certain 
category of persons”). 
 40. See Askin, supra note 10, at 318 (heralding the Akayesu decision for its 
landmark recognition of sexual violence as an instrument of genocide and for 
formulating “seminal definitions of a rape and sexual violence under international 
law”).  Specifically, the ICTR ruled as follows: 
The Tribunal considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central 
elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description 
of objects and body parts.  The Tribunal also notes the cultural sensitivities 
involved in public discussion of intimate matters and recalls the painful 
reluctance and inability of witnesses to disclose graphic anatomical details of 
sexual violence they endured . . . .  The Tribunal defines rape as a physical 
invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which 
are coercive.  The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as 
any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances 
which are coercive.  Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the 
human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even 
physical contact . . . .  The Tribunal notes in this context that coercive 
circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force.  Threats, 
intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or 
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain 
circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe 
among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal. 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 687-688. 
 41. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR 2000-56-I, 
Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 50 for Leave to Amend the Indictment 
Issued on 20 January 2000 and Confirmed on 28 January 2000, ¶ 26 (Mar. 26, 2004) 
(citing prosecutor’s reliance on the Akayesu proceedings in support of efforts to amend 
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In other cases, however, the Trial Chamber was not so generous in 
allowing for eleventh hour amendments on the basis of evidence emerging 
for the first time at trial.43  In Prosecutor v. Bagambiki (also known as the 
Cyangugu trial), for example, female witnesses once again began giving 
testimony at trial about sexual violence they experienced in the relevant 
prefecture.  Once again, the Coalition moved to appear as amicus, urging 
the Tribunal to call upon the prosecution to consider amending the 
operative indictment44 to include sexual violence charges45 based upon 
                                                           
the indictments and subsequently amending the indictment to include rape as a crime 
against humanity).  Although many ICTR indictments were eventually amended, often 
by Jallow as Chief Prosecutor, there is the impression that some amendments were 
hastily drafted primarily to appease international NGOs without sufficient evidentiary 
support.  See Jefferson, supra note 19, at 340.  Human Rights Watch notes that “NGOs 
have expressed concerns . . . that this strategy will undermine the tribunal’s long-term 
effectiveness regarding the prosecution of sexual assault.”  Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana & Hategekimana,  Case No. ICTR 00-55-I, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Severance and Leave to Amend the 
Indictment Against Idelphonse Hategekimana, ¶¶ 26-30 (Sept. 25, 2007) (allowing 
amendment of an indictment issued in 2000 to clarify and expand the charges of rape).  
In Hategekimana, the Trial Chamber allowed Jallow to amend the existing indictment 
to add new rape and individual responsibility allegations (including liability for 
participating in a joint criminal enterprise) in support of the existing genocide and 
crimes against humanity counts. See id. ¶¶ 25, 27-28.  Although the Trial Chamber 
ruled that some of these amendments were supported by newly obtained evidence not 
available to the prosecution until 2006, with respect to the allegations that were not 
new, the Trial Chamber ruled that the prosecution was not trying to obtain an unfair 
advantage by seeking to add them at the time.  See id. ¶ 28.  The Chamber determined 
that the allegations would “provide the accused with better notice of the case against 
him and allow the Defence to better focus its investigation and case.”  Id. The 
prosecution’s request to refer the case to Rwanda was subsequently denied.  See 
Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR 2000-55B-R11bis, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to 
Rwanda, ¶ 78 (June 19, 2008). 
 43. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR 99-50-I, Indictment, 
¶¶ 5.37, 6.65 (May 9, 1999) (alleging acts of sexual violence around Rwanda against 
Tutsi individuals and charging defendants with rape as a crime against humanity and a 
war crime).  Jallow later sought to amend this indictment to clarify and expand upon, 
inter alia, the sexual violence allegations and to focus on the role of the accused in 
ordering, inciting, committing, aiding, and abetting the crimes in question.  See 
Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR 99-50-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for Leave to File an Amended Indictment, ¶ 5(b)-(d) (Oct. 6, 2003).  The Trial 
Chamber denied the motion, which was filed a few months before the scheduled start 
of trial, on the ground that a late amendment involving substantial changes would 
prejudice the accused and delay the trial.  See id. ¶ 35.  The Appeals Chamber 
determined that the Trial Chamber did not exceed its discretion when it failed to 
authorize amendment under the circumstances.  See Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., 
Case No. ICTR 99-50-AR5, Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal against 
Trial Chamber II Decision of 6 October 2003 Denying Leave to File Amended 
Indictment, ¶ 21 (Feb. 12, 2004). 
 44. See Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situation, Failure to 
Charge Sexual Violence in the Cyangugu Case, http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/ 
site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/index_en.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2009) (describing the 
Coalition’s efforts in the Bagambiki case).  See also Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. 
ICTR 96-10-I, Amended Indictment, Count 1-6 (Jan. 26, 1998) (charging the accused 
persons with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity for killing, 
exterminating, and causing bodily harm to members of the Tutsi group without 
explicitly charging them with sexual violence or rape); Prosecutor v. Bagambiki & 
Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR 97-36-I, Indictment, ¶ 4 (Oct. 9, 1997).  Eventually, the 
Bagambiki & Imanishimwe case and the Ntagerura case were joined.  See Prosecutor v. 
Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR 96-10-I, Prosecutor v. Bagambiki et al.,  Case No. ICTR 97-
36-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Joinder, ¶ 60 (Oct. 11, 1999).  The 
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evidence in the public domain about the prevalence of genocidal sexual 
violence in Cyangugu.46  This time, however, the prosecution joined the 
defense in opposing the Coalition’s motion, arguing that the choice of 
which charges to bring was dedicated to prosecutorial discretion.47  The 
prosecution also indicated its intention48 to submit a new indictment 
including rape allegations against at least two of the accused, thus mooting 
the amicus.  Siding with the parties, the Chamber denied the Coalition’s 
motion on the grounds that the question was no longer a live one and that it 
was beyond the Trial Chamber’s power to order an amendment.49  
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber excluded evidence of uncharged crimes of 
sexual violence fearing prejudice to the accused.50  This required female 
witnesses to artificially truncate their testimony.51  The Tribunal 
                                                           
Prosecutor had earlier moved to amend the indictments to charge rape, but later 
withdrew that motion.  See Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, 
Decision on the Application to File an Amicus Curiae Brief According to Rule 74 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Filed on Behalf of the NGO Coalition for 
Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, ¶ 9 (May 24, 2001) [hereinafter 
Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the Application to File an 
Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
 45. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 14-15 (noting that strong evidence of gender 
violence existed, in particular against Imanishimwe, who had allegedly raped a woman 
himself and killed a woman by shooting a gun into her vagina). 
 46. See, e.g., Monique Kankera, Sexual Violence in Cyangugu: A Testimonial, 
RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, Oct. 20, 2001, http://www.dd-rd.ca/english/commdoc/ 
publications/women/bulletin/vol4no1/testimonialCyangugu.html (noting 132 cases of 
reported rape in Cyangugu and citing other specific instances of sexual assault). 
 47. See Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the Application to 
File an Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 44, ¶ 9. 
 48. See id. ¶ 10; see also Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, 
Decision on the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situation’s Motion 
for Reconsideration of the Decision on Application to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, ¶ 8 
(Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the 
Coalition’s Motion for Reconsideration] (noting that the prosecutor indicated her 
intention to submit a separate indictment “with respect to the matter in question”); 
Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, This Year’s Monitoring 
Projects on Gender-Related Crimes at the ICTR, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONFLICT SITUATIONS NEWSL. (Rts. & Democracy, Montreal, Que.), October 20, 2001, 
available at http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/publications/index.php?id=1272&page=2& 
subsection=catalogue (welcoming the prosecutor’s assurance that charges of sexual 
violence would be filed). 
 49. See Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the Application to 
File an Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 44, ¶¶ 20-22 (May 24, 2001).  The Coalition 
moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Trial Chamber had misapplied Rule 74 
governing the submission of amicus briefs on the ground that its decision could be read 
to prohibit amicus intervention in relation to issues that are not already under 
consideration by the Trial Chamber, which would effectively prevent the participation 
of underrepresented groups in the development of the law.  See Ntagerura et al., Case 
No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the Coalition’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 
48, ¶ 2.  This motion was also denied on the ground that reconsideration was inapposite 
under the circumstances as “no new and potentially decisive fact” had been discovered.  
See id. ¶ 9. 
 50. See Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the Application to File an 
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 44, ¶¶ 23-24 (noting that the Chamber must exclude 
evidence of uncharged crimes). 
 51. Accord Michelle Staggs Kelsall & Shanee Stepakoff, “When We Wanted to 
Talk About Rape”: Silencing Sexual Violence at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 
INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 355, 363-74 (2007) (studying the exclusion of evidence 
during the Civil Defence Forces case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and 
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subsequently acquitted two of three defendants for lack of evidence,52 
generating outrage in Cyangugu, where women’s groups had meticulously 
gathered data on sexual crimes53 committed in their community.54  
Ultimately, the new indictment the prosecution promised never 
materialized. 
                                                           
demonstrating that women can be psychologically harmed when their stories of rape 
and sexual violence are silenced in criminal proceedings). 
 52. See Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶¶ 804-807 (Feb. 25, 2004).  In addition, many allegations in the indictment 
were disregarded as defective or unacceptably vague.  See id. ¶¶ 64-68.  The Appeals 
Chamber affirmed the acquittals and set aside several convictions of defendant 
Imanishimwe.  See Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 129 (July 7, 2006). 
 53. See, e.g., Kankera, supra note 46 (discussing victim testimonials about sexual 
violence that were gathered from local women by AVEGA-Cyangugu, an organization 
that works with widows in Rwanda).  Indeed, subsequent Cyangugu indictments 
detailed acts of sexual violence committed in the region.  See Prosecutor v. Bizimungu 
et al., Case No. ICTR 2000-56-I, Amended Indictment (Joinder), ¶ 117 (Aug. 23, 2004) 
(stating that “[i]n Cyangugu, soldiers from the Rwandan Army and Interahamwe 
regularly abducted Tutsi refugee women . . . and raped them and assaulted them 
morally.”).  The ICTR permitted Jallow to amend this indictment to add charges of rape 
as a crime against humanity and accordingly granted additional time to the accused to 
meet the new charges.  See Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR 2000-
56-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 50 for Leave to Amend the 
Indictment Issued on 20 January 2000 and Confirmed on 28 January 2000, ¶¶ 50, 55 
(Mar. 26, 2004).  The case is ongoing. 
 54. Efforts to “fix” incomplete or weak indictments have yielded similar results in 
a few cases before the ICTY.  The most egregious is the Lukić case in which the 
defendants were initially indicted for a number of crimes, but no crimes of gender 
violence.  See Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on 
Prosecution Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Second Amended Indictment and on 
Prosecution Motion to Include UN Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) as 
Additional Supporting Material to Proposed Third Amended Indictment as Well as on 
Milan Lukić’s Request for Reconsideration or Certification of the Pre-Trial Judge’s 
Order of 19 June 2008 (July 8, 2008) (discussing Prosecution’s motion to amend the 
indictment to include new charges for rape).  Under the leadership of Del Ponte, the 
ICTY prosecutor’s office had indicated an interest in amending the indictment and was 
given until November 2007 to do so.  No amendment was forthcoming, ostensibly 
because Del Ponte felt that to lengthen the prosecutor’s case would be contrary to the 
Completion Strategy.  After Del Ponte stepped down, Brammertz attempted to amend 
the indictment well after the deadline for doing so.  In addition to clarifying the charged 
forms of responsibility, Brammertz sought to add new counts concerning the crimes of 
rape, torture, and enslavement arising out of the defendants’ alleged establishment of a 
rape camp.  Many of the victims and witnesses to these crimes had already been 
disclosed to the defendants.  Indeed, eighteen of the twenty-six female witnesses on the 
prosecutor’s witness list apparently had testimony about the defendants’ involvement 
in sexual violence.  In support of his untimely motion, Brammertz argued that the 
crimes should be charged because of their grave and systematic nature; they were 
integral to other persecutory policies employed in Višegrad; the prosecutor did not need 
to call new witnesses; the defense would have adequate time to meet the new charges; 
the testimony would assist the prosecutor in meeting the defendants’ apparent alibi 
defenses; and, most importantly, the testimony was necessary “in the interest of 
justice” in order to allow the witnesses to testify fully about the harm they suffered at 
the hands of the defendants and to establish the full truth of the defendants’ crimes.  
The ICTY denied the motion to amend the indictment on the ground that allowing the 
amendment after the prosecutor’s unjustified delay would unduly prejudice the 
accused.  See id. ¶ 62.  Bizarrely, the women will still testify in order to rebut the 
defendants’ alibi defenses, but the gender crimes they will describe will be uncharged. 
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The failure of prosecutorial personnel to surface allegations about sexual 
violence in early investigations may be because the majority of the original 
investigators were men drawn from national police or armed forces,55 with 
little experience and training in taking rape testimony from female victims 
and making it trial ready.56  Critics also point to the original lack of gender 
justice expertise in the ICTR’s Office of the Prosecutor and the 2000 
decision to disband the sexual assault investigative team.57  Early errors, 
missteps, and omissions in the investigative phase inevitably reverberate 
through subsequent proceedings and cases as the lack of a complete 
investigation generates weaker evidence, which then justifies prioritizing 
other charges with stronger evidentiary support.58  Collectively, these 
factors create a self-reinforcing cycle of under-prosecution and impunity 
vis-à-vis gender crimes.  Properly investigating these situations ex ante 
would have obviated the need to seek amendments after indictments had 
been issued and even during trial, ensured cases went to trial without 
evidentiary gaps, and avoided due process concerns for defendants, who 
are entitled both to know the charges against them in advance and to a 
speedy trial. 
B. The Charging Phase 
Even where investigations into gender crimes are rigorously conducted, 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to which charges to 
                                                           
 55. See Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 277, 280 (2002) (noting gender bias among investigators, limited 
backgrounds and training of staff, and lack of female investigators); Peggy Kuo, 
Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 305, 310-11 
(2002) (recounting comments such as “‘I’ve got ten dead bodies, how do I have time 
for rape?  That’s not important,’ or, ‘So, a bunch of guys got riled up after a day of war, 
what’s the big deal?’”). 
 56. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 12-13 (highlighting these problems as 
undermining the effective prosecution of sexual violence by the ICTR).  The ICTR 
experienced a number of problems with their investigators.  One investigator had 
actually been working under a false name and was later indicted by the ICTR.  See, 
e.g., Prosecutor v. Nchamiligo, Case No. ICTR 2001-63-I, Amended Indictment (July 
18, 2006). 
 57. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 9-10 (maintaining that the Office of the 
Prosecutor lacked political will to investigate sexual violence during the early days of 
the tribunal).  But see Goldstone, supra note 55, at 280 (detailing how Justice 
Goldstone responded to concerns about sexual violence prosecutions during his tenure 
as the first ICTR prosecutor by appointing in 1994 Patricia Viseur Sellers as a Legal 
Officer on Gender Issues for the Office of the Prosecutor to direct the indictment of 
individuals responsible for gender violence crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda).  Justice 
Goldstone recalls that soon after he “arrived as the Chief Prosecutor in The Hague on 
August 15, 1994, [he] was inundated with letters and petitions from women and men in 
the United States, Canada, and many of the western European nations.  The letters 
implored [him] to give adequate attention to gender-related crimes.”  Id.  Prosecutor 
Louise Arbour, who served from 1996-1999, increased efforts to prosecute gender 
crimes and organized two gender training seminars for her staff in 1997.  See 
NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 9-10.  The sexual violence unit was disbanded in 2000 
under Del Ponte, although it was subsequently reconstituted in 2003 amid criticism of 
her approach to gender violence.  See id. at 10-11. 
 58. See Oosterveld, supra note 18, at 125-28 (discussing the “negative lessons 
learned from the ICTR,” which include the lesson that inconsistent prosecution and 
poor investigations lead to dropped charges and acquittals of sexual violence crimes). 
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bring and how to frame them under the applicable law can result in the 
exclusion of viable charges for gender violence.59  Obviously, there are 
valid strategic reasons for issuing more simplified indictments and for 
excluding certain charges even where sufficient evidence to convict may 
exist.60  Particularly in international criminal law, the practical reality is 
that prosecutorial and investigative resources are scarce, and the 
international and hybrid tribunals will only pursue a small fraction of the 
crimes committed in the relevant region or situation.61  In addition, since 
the debacle of the Milosević super-indictment, international criminal law 
has witnessed an emerging trend toward drafting more focused, symbolic, 
or streamlined indictments.  This seems to have occurred in the Lubanga 
case before the ICC, which addresses only the conscription, enlistment, and 
use of child soldiers in armed conflict, despite the fact that evidence in the 
public realm strongly suggested the existence of other potential charges, 
including charges of sexual violence.  The perennial risk exists, however, 
that such decisions will systematically exclude gender violence charges as 
too difficult to prove or non-essential.62  In particular, there is a tendency to 
view acts of gender violence committed during armed conflicts or 
repression as simply opportunistic or as private crimes reflecting personal 
motives and desires that are unconnected to, or simply capitalizing upon, 
the prevailing state of war—an attitude that mirrors the public/private 
divide that runs through much of law and society.63  To ensure against the 
systemic exclusion of gender violence charges, such crimes must be treated 
as integral to any armed conflict, genocide, or campaign of ethnic cleansing 
rather than as isolated or peripheral phenomena.  Such an approach reflects 
the fact that gender violence is regularly employed alongside and to 
exacerbate other forms of violence and repression.64 
                                                           
 59. Cf. NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 10 (noting a significant decline in 
investigations of sexual violence during Carla Del Ponte’s tenure as prosecutor, despite 
strong evidence in support of sexual violence claims in the possession of the 
prosecutor’s office). 
 60. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR 98-44C-T, Judgment, 
¶¶ 20-22 (Sept. 20, 2006) (discussing how Rwamakuba’s case was severed from a joint 
indictment, and a new indictment was issued, which focused more closely on the 
defendant’s direct responsibility for a limited number of criminal events, rather than his 
participation in a conspiracy or joint criminal enterprise).  Although the joint 
indictment charged rape as a crime against humanity, the rape charges were not 
included in the new indictment.  See id. ¶ 86 (stating the verdict on the counts charged). 
 61. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, A Word from the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT. 
NEWSL. (In’l Crim. Ct., The Hague, Neth.) Nov. 2006, at 2 (“My office employs a 
policy of focused investigations and prosecutions.”). 
 62. See Susan M. Pritchett, Entrenched Hegemony, Efficient Procedure, or 
Selective Justice?: An Inquiry into Charges for Gender-Based Violence at the 
International Criminal Court, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 293 (2008) 
(observing that the frequent combination of gender violence with other war crimes 
encourages prosecutors to select alternative charges). 
 63. See id. at 301-02 (noting that local laws sometimes punish rape lightly, or even 
require rapists to marry their victims). 
 64. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 734 (Sept. 2, 1998) (noting that sexual violence was an integral part of the process of 
destruction of the Tutsi group in Rwanda); see also S.C. Res. 1820, supra note 6, ¶ 1 
(noting that sexual violence against women “can significantly exacerbate situations of 
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Given their pervasiveness in situations of lawlessness, acts of gender 
violence can be cumulatively charged under multiple genus crimes (e.g., as 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide) to ensure a conviction 
where the particular circumstantial elements of each crime (e.g., the 
existence of an armed conflict, a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population, or genocidal intent) might be difficult to prove.65  With 
respect to war crimes, the drafters of the ICTR Statute borrowed directly 
from existing treaty law by incorporating parts of Protocol II and Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.66  As such, the Statute penalizes 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault,”67 
along with a number of generic crimes that may encompass gender 
violence, including the commission of violence to life, health and physical 
or mental well-being, cruel treatment, and torture.68 
In order to convict an individual for war crimes, the prosecutor must also 
demonstrate some nexus between the act committed and the armed 
conflict.69  The struggle within the ad hoc tribunals to define this link 
doctrinally became particularly acute in the Rwandan context, because 
although the genocide occurred nationwide, the actual theater of war—
which pitted governmental armed forces against the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF)—only engulfed part of the country.  This led to a number of 
acquittals on war crimes counts, although most defendants were convicted 
of genocide and crimes against humanity for the same acts, which require 
no link to armed conflict.  In the Kayishema case, for example, the Trial 
Chamber ruled that it was insufficient to show merely a temporal 
concurrence between the crimes charged and the internal armed conflict 
being waged elsewhere in the country.  Rather, the Trial Chamber required 
a showing of a “direct link” between crimes committed and the hostilities70 
and that the defendants were connected to one of the two embattled 
                                                           
armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security”). 
 65. See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: Part II: Finalized Draft 
Text of the Elements of Crimes, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) 
(declaring that “particular conduct may constitute one or more crimes”). 
 66. See ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 4 (empowering the International Tribunal 
for Rwanda to prosecute persons for war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts). 
 67. See id. art. 4, ¶ e (noting that this language is drawn from the “fundamental 
guarantees” contained in Article 4 of Protocol II). 
 68. Cf. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 2 (noting that the ICTY Statute also 
incorporated a composite of the Geneva Conventions’ grave breaches regimes, which 
do not list rape or sexual violence as grave breaches, but rather penalize torture, 
inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering, and willfully causing serious 
injury to body or health). 
 69. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, 
¶ 169 (May 21, 1999) (setting forth the test for an act to breach Common Article 3 and 
Protocol II). 
 70. See id. ¶ 185 (asserting that only crimes which occur in the context of war fall 
within Common Article 3). 
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parties.71  The Trial Chamber also noted that the armed conflict had been 
used as pretext to unleash an official policy of genocide, but that these two 
phenomena were distinct within the region in question.72 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber ultimately rejected this approach in the 
Yugoslavian context.  In the Kunarac case, the Appeals Chamber ruled that 
the armed conflict must only have “played a substantial part in the 
perpetrator’s ability to commit [the charged crime], his decision to commit 
it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was 
committed,” and that it was enough if, as in the present case, “the 
perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed 
conflict.”73  The Tribunal identified a nonexclusive series of factors that 
would help to guide this inquiry, which include: the perpetrator is a 
combatant; the victim is a noncombatant; the victim is a member of the 
opposing party; the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military 
campaign; and the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the 
perpetrator’s official duties.74  In the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, drafters 
settled on the following formulation: it must be shown that the charged 
conduct “took place in the context of and was associated with” an 
international or non-international armed conflict.75  This formulation eases 
up on the strict requirements established in Kayishema and seems to imply 
the necessity of only a geographical and temporal nexus.  As a result, it will 
facilitate the prosecution of gender crimes as war crimes.76 
Acts of gender violence may also be prosecuted as crimes against 
humanity where they form part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
a civilian population and there is evidence that the defendant knew of the 
existence of the attack.77  The criteria of “widespread or systematic” 
modify the attack against a civilian population, not the enumerated acts.78  
As a result, isolated or discrete acts of sexual violence may be prosecuted 
as crimes against humanity so long as they are part of a larger attack.  
Although rape is the only crime of gender violence specifically enumerated 
within the ICTR’s crimes against humanity provision,79 sexual violence 
                                                           
 71. See id. ¶¶ 174-175.  But see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-A, 
Appeal Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 425-446 (granting the prosecution’s appeal of this 
requirement by ruling that civilians can also be guilty of war crimes). 
 72. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 603.  These defendants were 
acquitted of war crimes, id. ¶ 615, and the prosecution did not appeal. 
 73. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 58 (June 12, 2002). 
 74. See id. ¶ 59. 
 75. See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 65, art. 8 
(declaring that a perpetrator’s knowledge of this nexus, plus the necessary acts, is 
sufficient to establish the existence of war crimes). 
 76. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko & Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR 97-21-I, 
Amended Indictment, count 11 (Mar. 1, 2001) (accusing Nyiramasukuko and Ntahobali 
of the war crimes of humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, and indecent assault). 
 77. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 65, art. 7(1)(a), 
¶¶ 2-3. 
 78. Id. ¶ 2. 
 79. The Bucyibaruta and Munyeshyaka indictments contained extensive sexual 
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could also be charged under the ICTR Statute’s gender-blind provisions 
penalizing acts of torture,80 enslavement,81 persecution,82 and “other 
inhumane acts,”83 because conviction for those crimes requires proof of 
elements additional to those of rape.84  The latter “catch all” provisions of 
persecution and inhumane acts are particularly useful for charging acts of 
gender violence that fall short of rape (such as assault, forced nudity, 
                                                           
violation allegations, which the prosecutor charged as crimes against humanity (rape) 
and genocide. Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I (June 16, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR 2005-87-I, Indictment (July 20, 2005).  
The cases, however, were transferred to France (where the defendants were residing) 
for prosecution pursuant to Rule 11bis.  Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-05-
85-I, Designation of a Trial Chamber for the Referral of the Case to a State 
(July 11, 2007), Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to 
France (Nov. 20, 2007). France is the first country to prosecute cases referred from the 
ICTR in connection with the Tribunal’s Completion Strategy. 
 80. See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 295 (Dec. 10, 1998) (describing sexual assault as “a particularly vicious form of 
torture”); see also Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, ¶¶ 488-499 (Feb. 20, 2001) (affirming conviction of rape as torture); 
Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 506 (May 
15, 2003) (entering cumulative convictions for rape and torture). 
 81. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 8 (Feb. 22, 2001) (convicting the defendants of gender-based 
crimes, including enslavement). 
 82. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 1079 (Dec. 3, 2003). 
Tutsi women, in particular, were targeted for persecution.  The portrayal of the 
Tutsi woman as a femme fatale, and the message that Tutsi women were 
seductive agents of the enemy was conveyed repeatedly by [defendants’ media 
outlets].  The [Hutu] Ten Commandments . . . vilified and endangered Tutsi 
women . . . .  By defining the Tutsi woman as an enemy in this way, 
[defendants’ media outlets] articulated a framework that made the sexual 
attack of Tutsi women a foreseeable consequence of the role attributed to 
them. 
Id.  Notwithstanding this link between misogynist propaganda and sexual violence, 
none of the media cases charged the defendants with inciting or instigating rape.  See 
id.; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Amended Indictment, ¶ 5.7 
(Dec. 10, 1998) (accusing Ruggiu of abetting the persecution of Tutsis by, among other 
things, broadcasting messages that called for “acts of hatred and sexual violence” 
against Tutsi women).  See also Prosecutor v. Serugendo, Case No. ICTR 2005-84-I, 
Corrigendum of Indictment (July 21, 2005). Both Ruggiu and Serugendo ultimately 
pled guilty to incitement to genocide and persecution.  Although the indictment in an 
additional incitement case contained a number of general allegations of sexual 
violence, the prosecution did not connect the alleged acts of incitement to these crimes 
in the specific charges.  See Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 2001-72-I, 
Amended Indictment Pursuant to Decisions of 11 May 2005 and 10 June 2005 
(June 15, 2005) (indicting the accused, a singer, for incitement).  But see  Prosecutor v. 
Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 2001-72-T, Trial Chamber Judgment ¶ 47 (Dec. 2, 2008) 
(finding that merely recording songs encouraging ethnic hatred did not necessarily 
demonstrate genocidal intent). 
 83. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶¶ 688, 697 (Sept. 2, 1998) (remarking that “[s]exual violence falls within 
the scope of ‘other inhumane acts,’ set forth [in] Article 3(i) of the Tribunal’s Statute,” 
and emphasizing that Akayesu was judged criminally responsible under Article 3(i) for 
forcibly undressing women and making them parade around in public). 
 84. See generally Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgment (Jan. 14, 2000) (establishing a regime for cumulative charging). 
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etc.).85  Where more generic charges are utilized, however, there is a risk 
that the gendered nature of the crimes will be obscured or rendered less 
salient. 
Finally, the Akayesu decision confirmed that acts of rape and sexual 
violence may serve as the predicate acts of genocide along with murder and 
assault.  In particular, it ruled: 
With regard [to] rape and sexual violence, the Chamber wishes to 
underscore the fact that in its opinion, they constitute genocide in the 
same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the 
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted 
as such.  Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction 
of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and are even, according 
to the Chamber, one of the worst ways of [inflicting] harm on the victim 
as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm . . . .  These rapes 
resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their 
families and their communities.  Sexual violence was an integral part of 
the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and 
specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the 
Tutsi group as a whole.86 
The Tribunal concluded that even those rapes that did not result in the 
death of the victim could constitute genocide where “[s]exual violence was 
a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group—destruction of the 
spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.”87  The Trial Chamber 
recognized that perpetrators often mutilated their victims before killing 
them.88  The intent was to destroy the Tutsi group while inflicting acute 
physical and mental suffering on its members in the process.89  In this way, 
the Tribunal emphasized that both the mental and physical harm associated 
with rape satisfied the actus reus of the crime of genocide. 
In defending their charging decisions in the face of motions to dismiss 
for defects in the form of the indictment, prosecutors must be able to 
articulate why particular and cumulative charges are warranted under the 
law.  In particular, prosecutors must be able to demonstrate allegations 
                                                           
 85. See ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 4(e) (reiterating that acts of sexual violence 
can be charged as the war crime of “committing outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment”); see also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, 
Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 295 (convicting defendant of 
torture and outrages upon personal dignity for being present while a women was 
repeatedly raped and humiliated); Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & 
IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 33 (convicting defendant where he 
forced women to dance nude on a table while others watched). 
 86. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 731. 
 87. Id. ¶ 732. 
 88. Id. ¶ 731. 
 89. See id. (emphasizing that, unlike other depictions of genocidal rape, this 
account of murderous genocidal rape does not depend upon rapes happening in a 
“traditional” or patriarchal cultural milieu that values women’s chastity or fidelity); cf. 
Adrienne Kalosieh, Note, Consent to Genocide? The ICTY’s Improper Use of the 
Consent Paradigm to Prosecute Genocidal Rape in Foča, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 121, 132 (2003) (emphasizing the religious and cultural characteristics of Bosnian 
Muslim society in describing the genocidal impact of rape). 
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relevant to all circumstantial and substantive elements of the crimes.  In 
addition, with respect to cumulative charges, prosecutors must be prepared 
to educate the court about how cumulative charges can enhance the 
expressive function of the law, create a fuller trial record of the nature of 
the atrocities committed, and justify an elevated sentence where the extra 
elements (e.g., the specific intent to cause severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, for torture or the discriminatory motive for persecution) 
should be treated as an aggravating sentencing factor.90 
Before the ICTR, many defendants91 were not charged with acts of 
sexual violence in their initial indictments.92  Rather, these charges were 
added by way of amendment, often upon motion by Hassan Bubacar Jallow 
when he took over as Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR.93  In addition, there 
                                                           
 90. See generally ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: 
INTERNAL OTP DISCUSSION PAPER (2006) [hereinafter OTP, THE INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE] (detailing the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s bases for making the decision to 
open investigations and begin prosecutions while taking into account the interests of 
justice, the gravity of the crime, and the interests of the victim). 
 91. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR 96-17-
T, Amended Indictment, ¶ 1 (July 7, 1998) (charging genocide-related crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-
DP, Indictment, ¶ 1 (Oct. 16, 1997) (charging genocide, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public indictment to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide 
and crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-I, 
Indictment (Feb, 13, 1996) (charging genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes); Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-I, Amended Indictment, ¶ 1 
(Sept. 17, 1999) (charging genocide-related crimes, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes).  Many of these early indictments focused on particular massacres.  See, e.g., 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-I, First Amended 
Indictment, ¶ 1 (Apr. 11, 1997) (charging genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes); Prosecutor v. Rutaginira, Case No. ICTR 95-1C-T, Trial Chamber Judgment 
and Sentence (Mar. 14, 2005) (confirming guilty plea for extermination); Prosecutor v. 
Seromba. Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I, Indictment (June 8, 2001) (charging genocide-
related crimes); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR 2001-66-I, Indictment, ¶ 1 (June 
8, 2001) (charging genocide-related crimes). 
 92. See, e.g., GAËLLE BRETON LE-GOFF, COALITION FOR WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS, ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN SEXUAL VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS IN 
INDICTMENTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (ICTR) FROM 
NOVEMBER 1995 TO NOVEMBER 2002 (2002), http://www.womensrightscoalition. 
org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/analysisoftrends_en.php 
(noting that “the proportion of indictments pertaining to sexual violence fell from 
100% [in] 1999-2000 to 35% in 2001-2002”); letter from Ariane Brunet, Women’s 
Rights Coordinator, Rights & Democracy, on behalf of the Coalition for Women’s 
Human Rights in Conflict Situations et al., to Hussan Jallow, Prosecutor, ICTR (Feb. 8, 
2005), 
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDen
iedJustice/lettertoJallow_en.php (indicating that the OTP failed to bring rape charges in 
70% of the cases in which judgments were delivered).  By way of contrast, the former 
Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone integrated charges of sexual 
violence into virtually all indictments.  In addition, he successfully charged individuals 
with forced marriage, which is not specifically enumerated in the Statute of the Special 
Court.  See Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, 
Judgment, at ¶¶ 175-203 (Feb. 22, 2008).   
 93. See Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR 2000-56-I, Amended 
Indictment (Joinder), ¶ 110 (Aug. 23, 2004) (accusing defendants of crimes against 
humanity for organizing widespread and systemic rape, among other atrocities).  See 
also Prosecutor v. Kabiligi & Ntabakuze, Case Nos. ICTR 97-34-I & ICTR 97-30-I, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 29, 66 (Oct. 8, 1999) 
(adding a count of rape as a crime against humanity on motion by Del Ponte). 
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were instances in which the sexual violence counts were weak or poorly 
pled,94 resulting in their dismissal.  In Semanza, for example, the 
Prosecutor indicted the defendant for rape as an act of genocide, a crime 
against humanity, and a war crime.95  The ICTR dismissed most of the rape 
allegations as impermissibly vague.96  At trial, the Prosecution did not 
provide evidence with respect to other rapes and sexual assaults alleged, 
resulting in the rejection of those charges.97  The rape of one woman did 
result in a conviction for instigating a crime against humanity.98 
Although they have yet to be tested, provisions in the ICC Statute appear 
to provide for an expanded role for the Court in having an impact on which 
charges are brought against particular defendants.99  Most notably, upon 
confirming the charges against an accused pursuant to Article 61 of the 
Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber can request that the prosecutor conduct 
further investigation with respect to a particular charge or to “amend a 
charge because the evidence submitted appears to establish a different 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”100  In addition, decisions by the 
prosecution to decline to initiate either an investigation or prosecution are 
subject to some oversight by the Pre-Trial Chamber.101  In such 
                                                           
 94. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No. ICTR 98-40-I, Indictment, ¶ 6.26 
(Sept. 26, 1998) (setting forth relatively pro forma sexual violence charges, not 
elaborated upon in substantive counts); see also Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No. 
ICTR 98-40-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw the Indictment, ¶ 1 
(Mar. 18, 1999) (emphasizing that this indictment was later withdrawn after all but a 
few counts dealing with attacks on Belgian soldiers and Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the 
former Rwandan Prime Minister who was killed and then apparently sexually 
assaulted, were dismissed at the time of confirmation).  Belgium intervened in the 
proceedings and later convicted the accused of the murder of the peacekeepers.  The 
murders of the peacekeepers and the Prime Minister also served as the subject of the 
Military I proceedings against Col. Théoneste Bagosora and his co-defendants.  
Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Trial Chamber Judgment & 
Sentence, ¶ 576 (Dec. 18, 2008).  The ICTR convicted all but Gratien Kabiligi, whose 
alibi defense led to his acquittal.  Id. ¶¶ 1969-1986.  
 95. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-I, Third Amended Indictment, 
¶ 1 (Oct. 12, 1999). 
 96. See Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Trial Chamber Judgment 
& Sentence, ¶¶ 51-52 (May 15, 2003) (noting that the broad allegations left the 
impression that the prosecutor had not obtained any particular information or 
evidence). 
 97. Id. ¶¶ 250-251. 
 98. See id. ¶¶ 475-479, 480-485, 506, 542-545, 547-548 (stating that the Appeals 
Chamber ruled that the Trial Chamber erred by not also entering a conviction for war 
crimes (outrages upon personal dignity) for this rape in light of the fact that the 
elements of crimes against humanity and war crimes are materially different); 
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 369, 
390-395 (May 25, 2005) (emphasizing that the Appeals Chamber also found that the 
Trial Chamber did not exceed its discretion in sentencing the defendant to only seven 
years imprisonment for the rape). 
 99. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 4. 
 100. Id. art. 61(7)(c). 
 101. See id. art. 53(3)(a) (stating that in the case of a referral from the Security 
Council or a State Party, the Pre-Trial Chamber can “request the Prosecutor to 
reconsider [his or her] decision” not to proceed if so requested by the source of the 
referral); id. art. 53(3)(b) (adding that a decision by the Prosecutor not to proceed with 
an investigation or prosecution on the basis of the “interests of justice” is “effective 
only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber”). 
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circumstances, there may be enhanced opportunities for victims as well as 
segments of civil society to intervene and petition the Court to encourage 
the prosecutor to include charges of gender violence.102 
1. Gravity 
Several of the international criminal law tribunals are specifically 
charged in their constitutive documents with concentrating on the most 
serious crimes of international concern103 or upon high level defendants 
                                                           
 102. The Lubanga case is not encouraging in this regard, however.  Advocates for 
gender justice decried the limited nature of the indictment against the accused in the 
face of evidence of widespread sexual violence committed by his subordinates.  See 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Request Submitted Pursuant to 
Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for Leave to Participate as Amicus 
Curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation Proceedings, ¶¶ 4-21 (Sept. 7, 2006) (attempt by 
the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice to intervene as an amicus at the time the 
indictment against Lubanga was confirmed, pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rome Statute, to 
encourage the prosecution to include charges of sexual violence—rape and sexual 
assault, forced marriage, enslavement, and enforced pregnancy); Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/01-01/06, Decision on Request Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of 
the Statute of the ICC, 3 (Sept. 26, 2006) (denying the right of intervention under Rule 
103, on the ground that the request for additional gender charges “ha[d] no link with 
the present case”).  At first, the ICC prosecutor indicated that he would keep the 
investigation against Lubanga open.  See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, A Word from the 
Prosecutor, supra note 61, at 2 (noting that the indictment for using child soldiers did 
not “exclude the continuation of investigations into other crimes allegedly committed 
by Mr. Lubanga Dyilo after the current proceedings are closed”); Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Address at Third Session of the Assembly of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 6, 2004), 
available at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=asp3 (announcing that he would temporarily 
suspend further investigations until the present charges were tried and also stating that 
a focused prosecutorial strategy means “centering our efforts on perpetrators bearing 
the greatest responsibility, with a policy of short investigations, targeted indictments 
and expeditious trials”).  In addition, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special 
Representative on Children and Armed Conflict, presented an amicus curiae brief 
asking the Court to include consideration of sexual violence suffered by girls abducted 
into militia.  See United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Children and Armed Conflict, Written Submissions of the United Nations Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict; Submitted in 
Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 18-26, delivered to 
the International Criminal Court, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 
(Mar. 17, 2003) (raising concerns that such charges will never be brought if not brought 
initially, and noting that even the most narrow conception of “case” or “link” might 
have supported the intervention of this NGO and the proposed amendment given the 
fact that many girls and young women were abducted for the purpose of serving as 
child soldiers and were subjected to gender violence at the hands of rebels under 
Lubanga’s command and control); see also Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Decision on Request Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Statute of the ICC (arguing that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber could have interpreted “case” more broadly to refer not to the 
existing charged crimes, but to any relevant charges that could be brought against the 
accused in relation to his conduct in the particular situation); Pritchett, supra note 62 
(discussing gender violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Lubanga 
proceedings, and the failed efforts to expand the charges). 
 103. See ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (noting the ICTR, for example, is 
dedicated to prosecuting “persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda”); see also ICTY Statute, supra 
note 1, art. 1 (containing similar language to the ICTR Statute); ICTR Statute, supra 
note 1, art. 4 (empowering the Tribunal to prosecute “persons committing or ordering 
to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949”); Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 5(1) (stating that the “jurisdiction of 
the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole”).  Admissibility under the Rome Statute also invokes the 
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who are most responsible for the commission of international crimes.104  
Where gravity is a decisive factor in choosing which charges to bring, 
prosecuting gender violence may be subordinated to other prosecutorial 
priorities if gender violence is not considered to be equal in severity and 
gravity to other war crimes,105 such as the deliberate targeting of civilians 
or the torture of prisoners of war, or to other crimes against humanity, such 
as extermination or persecution—all crimes that happen to both men and 
women. 
This seems to have been the case before the ICTR.  Indeed, early on, 
there were indications that the ICTR prosecutors did not consider acts of 
gender violence to be “as serious” as other acts of physical violence 
perpetrated against members of the Tutsi group during the genocide.106  In 
addition, it is not clear that prosecutors fully understood how rape was an 
integral part of the genocide in Rwanda.  Even after the Akayesu case 
established that rape can serve as a predicate act of genocide,107 only a 
                                                           
concept of gravity and provides that a case will be considered inadmissible if it “is not 
of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.”  Id. art. 17(1)(d) (clarifying 
that the prosecutor’s decisions first to initiate an investigation and then to initiate a 
prosecution are premised on the case’s presumed admissibility which includes a 
consideration of gravity).  Even further, the Rome Statute also states that the prosecutor 
may decline to initiate either an investigation or prosecution where there are 
“substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of 
justice,” taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims.  
Id. art. 53(1)(c).  On the basis of these provisions and prevailing interpretations thereof, 
gravity concerns are thus relevant before the ICC at two key moments: in the 
identification of potential situations to investigate and in the choice of particular cases 
(i.e., crimes or individuals) to investigate and prosecute.  See generally id. 
 104. See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with Inclusion 
of Amendments as Promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006) art. 1, 
available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_ 
Oct_2004_Eng.pdf [hereinafter Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers] 
(stating that the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia are to “bring to 
trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for 
the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian 
law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were 
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979”). 
 105. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8, ¶ 1.  In addition to the required nexus 
element, the ICC’s war crimes provision contains soft threshold language indicating 
that “[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes.”  This language emerged as a compromise between delegations that wanted 
more binding language specifically limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to such situations 
and delegations that did not want any threshold specific to war crimes.  
Notwithstanding its non-binding nature, such language will inevitably influence 
prosecutorial discretion and may prevent the prosecution of sporadic acts of gender 
violence that cannot be shown to be the result of a plan or policy to commit war crimes.  
Definitions of particular international crimes also contain gravity thresholds.  See, e.g., 
id. art. 6, ¶ 1(b) (setting forth the genocide actus reus of “causing serious bodily or 
mental harm” to members of a protected group); id. art. 7, ¶ 1(e) (including as a crime 
against humanity “severe deprivation of physical liberty”); id. art. 7, ¶ 1(g) (containing 
a similar provision with respect to “other form[s] of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity” to rape, sexual slavery, etc.). 
 106. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 94 (“There is a widespread 
perception among the Tribunal investigators that rape is somehow a ‘lesser’ or 
‘incidental’ crime not worth investigating.”).  See also supra note 55. 
 107. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998) (finding that rape and sexual violence constituted the infliction of 
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handful of subsequent defendants have been prosecuted108 for and 
convicted of genocidal rape,109 and few cases feature crimes of sexual 
violence at all.110  To date, the ICTR has not featured any prosecutions that 
focus particularly on gender-based crimes as was seen before the ICTY.111 
                                                           
serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and specifically that “[t]hese rapes 
resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and 
their communities.  Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, 
specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and 
to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.”). 
 108. Muhimana, for one, was charged with crimes against humanity, but not 
genocide, for allegedly committing multiple acts of rape and for assisting others in the 
commission of rape and other forms of sexual assault.  Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case 
No. ICTR 95-1B-I, Revised Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 4-7 (Feb. 3, 2004).  The ICTY 
has even fewer genocidal rape indictments.  The current indictments against Radovan 
Karadžić and Ratko Mladić before the ICTY plead sexual violence as a predicate act of 
genocide.  See Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18, Amended Indictment, ¶ 17 
(Apr. 28, 2000).  The original indictments against both men had specifically mentioned 
the rape of women in the recitation of genocidal crimes.  See Prosecutor v. Karadžić & 
Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Indictment, ¶ 19 (May 24, 1995). 
 109. See Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Trial Chamber Judgment 
and Sentence, ¶ 933 (Jan. 27, 2000) (resulting in a conviction for rape as genocide and 
as a crime against humanity before the same Trial Chamber that heard the Akayesu case 
on the basis of a similarly amended indictment).  In Musema, the Trial Chamber found 
that 
acts of serious bodily and mental harm, including rape and other forms of 
sexual violence were often accompanied by humiliating utterances, which 
clearly indicated that the intention underlying each specific act was to destroy 
the Tutsi group as a whole.  The Chamber noted, for example, that during the 
rape of Nyiramusugi, Musema declared: “The pride of the Tutsis will end 
today.”  In this context, the acts of rape and sexual violence were an integral 
part of the plan conceived to destroy the Tutsi group.  Such acts targeted Tutsi 
women, in particular, and specifically contributed to their destruction and 
therefore that of the Tutsi group as such.  Witness N testified before the 
Chamber that Nyiramusugi, who was left for dead by those who raped her, had 
indeed been killed in a way.  Indeed, the Witness specified that ‘what they did 
to her is worse than death.’ 
Id.  On appeal, new evidence emerged that controverted the key testimony presented at 
trial.  The Appeals Chamber ruled that a miscarriage of justice had occurred and 
quashed the rape as genocide conviction.  See Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 
96-13-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 172-194 (Nov. 6, 2001).  See also Prosecutor 
v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 321-333 (June 
17, 2004) (convicting defendant of genocidal rape); Wood, supra note 11, at 303-04 
(discussing the lack of charges in subsequent cases despite the Akayesu precedent). 
 110. Several indictments involving at large defendants do contain sexual violence 
allegations.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bizimana et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-I, 
Prosecutor’s Amended Indictment Pursuant to the Decision of Trial Chamber II on the 
Defence Motion, Pursuant to Rule 72 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Pertaining to, Inter Alia, Lack of Jurisdiction and Defect in the Form of the Indictment, 
¶¶ 72-107 (Nov. 21, 2001) (charging sexual violence as genocide and crimes against 
humanity). 
 111. Justice Richard Goldstone, the inaugural ICTY/ICTR prosecutor, issued from 
the ICTY the first international indictment focused exclusively on sexual violence 
committed in the town of Foča.  Defendants were convicted of rape and sexual slavery 
as crimes against humanity.  See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & 
23/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 4-11 (Feb. 22, 2001).  Likewise, Prosecutor v. 
Furundžija exclusively featured sexual violence charges.  After an eleven day trial—
the Tribunal’s shortest—the defendant was convicted of rape as a form of torture, a 
conviction upheld on appeal despite an unsuccessful challenge to the Judge’s 
impartiality.  Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶¶ 199-200 (July 21, 2000). On the impartiality argument, the Trial Chamber noted: 
[E]ven if it were established that Judge [Florence] Mumba expressly shared the 
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Gendered perceptions of the relative gravity of crimes may ultimately 
influence proceedings before the ICC as well.  At several points within the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), gravity operates as an 
express limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction and as a guide to the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion.112  And yet, the Court’s Statute and Elements of 
Crimes provide little in the way of concrete guidance about the quantitative 
or qualitative contours of this key concept.113  In his published criteria for 
the selection of cases and situations,114 the ICC Prosecutor has indicated 
that in assessing gravity, he will focus in part on the number of victims 
with reference to the scale of the crimes and the degree of systematicity in 
their commission.115  At the same time, he indicated that other more 
qualitative factors would also be relevant, such as whether the crimes are 
planned, cause “social alarm,” are ongoing or may be repeated, exhibit 
particular cruelty or reflect other aggravating circumstances, target 
especially vulnerable victims, are discriminatory in their execution, or 
involve an abuse of power.116  In addition, the prosecutor announced that he 
will consider “the broader impact of the crimes on the community and on 
regional peace and security, including longer term social, economic, and 
environmental damage.”117  By way of example, he noted that the situations 
currently under consideration in Central and East Africa involved 
thousands of displacements, killings, abductions, and large-scale sexual 
violence.118 
                                                           
goals and objectives of the U.N. [Commission on the Status of Women] and 
the Platform for Action, in promoting and protecting the human rights of 
women, that inclination, being of a general nature, is distinguishable from an 
inclination to implement those goals and objectives as a Judge in a particular 
case.  It follows that she could still sit on a case and impartially decide upon 
issues affecting women. 
Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7, ¶ (g). 
 113. For a comprehensive discussion of the way in which the concept of gravity 
undergirds the legal, moral, and sociological legitimacy of the International Criminal 
Court, see Margaret M. DeGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International 
Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (unpublished manuscript 
on file with the author). 
 114. See ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION: CRITERIA FOR 
SELECTION OF SITUATIONS AND CASES  4-5 (2006) [hereinafter DRAFT CRITERIA FOR 
SELECTION]. 
 115. See OTP, THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 5 (2006) (summarizing 
factors for determining whether the situation is of sufficient gravity). 
 116. Id.; see also DRAFT CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 114. 
 117. DRAFT CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 114; Letter from Sidiki Kaba, 
President, International Federation for Human Rights, to Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (Sept. 15, 2006), available at http://www.fidh. 
org/IMG/pdf/FIDH_comments_-_selection_criteria_-_final.pdf (approving of the 
ICC’s approach, particularly its consideration of “the impact of the crimes on the 
affected communities as well as on regional peace and security”). 
 118. DRAFT CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 114; see also Interactive Radio for 
Justice: Interview with Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Luis Moreno 
Ocampo (Apr. 5, 2006), http://www.irfj.org/Programs/Program11/IRFJ_prg11_ 
english.doc.  Ocampo took the opportunity to publicly acknowledge the gravity of 
sexual violence in a press interview: 
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The ICC adjudicated these gravity provisions for the first time in the 
cases arising out of the ongoing regional war being waged in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  The rulings emerged in the context of the 
prosecutor’s request to the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber for the issuance of 
arrest warrants against two defendants, Thomas Dyilo Lubanga and Bosco 
Ntaganda, pursuant to Rule 58(1) of the ICC Statute.119  In this matter of 
first impression, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that it had to confirm 
the admissibility of the case prior to issuing any arrest warrant. In so doing, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber looked to several factors.  First, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber considered the existence of systematic or large-scale crimes.120  
Second, the Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that it would consider the “social 
alarm” the relevant conduct caused within the international community.121  
Third, the Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that it would consider the position 
of the accused and whether he or she fell within the category of the most 
senior leaders engaged in the situation under investigation, taking into 
account the role of the suspect in the state or organization implicated in the 
abuses.122  The Chamber reasoned that such an interpretation would 
maximize the deterrent effect of the Court by focusing on those individuals 
most capable of preventing the commission of international crimes.123  
                                                           
I fully agree that this is one of the gravest crimes, raping women was a tool to 
destroy communities.  Rape as it was perpetrated in Congo does not constitute 
only sexual abuse but it is used as a weapon of war.  Because women form the 
basis of any community, women bring people together, and raping them is like 
raping the whole community.  We totally agree with you on the gravity of this 
crime. 
Id. 
 119. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 58(1) (stating that an arrest warrant is 
appropriate where there “are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has 
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court” and the arrest of the person 
appears necessary to guarantee his or her appearance, to ensure that the individual does 
not endanger the investigation, or to prevent the person from continuing the 
commission of that or other crimes). 
 120. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s 
Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58,” ¶ 56(i) (July 13, 2006) 
[hereinafter Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal].  
“Systematicity” can be interpreted to mean the crimes followed a pattern, are 
organized, or are being committed pursuant to a policy or plan.  It seems clear that 
“systemic” conduct need not be pursuant to a plan, policy, common design, or 
conspiracy if it is a regular or repeated feature of an armed conflict or state of 
repression that arises naturally without exogenous impetus.  The notion of “large-scale” 
denotes a quantitative measure and suggests that the crimes are numerous or 
widespread. 
 121. Id. ¶ 56(i). 
 122. Compare id. ¶¶ 56, 60, 66 (restating that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s reasoning for 
its three criteria, which, had it remained effective, would have precluded the pyramidal 
prosecutorial strategy employed by many domestic prosecutors and the ICTY), with 
Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes at the 
International Level, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 543 (2006) (noting the common 
practice of building “a case against the most senior persons responsible [with] a series 
of cases which ‘work up the ladder,’ prosecuting lower-level perpetrators in the 
collection of evidence against the higher-level perpetrators”). 
 123. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal, ¶ 60. 
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Although the Pre-Trial Chamber issued the arrest warrant for Lubanga,124 it 
determined that Ntaganda was not a central figure in the decision-making 
process of his group and lacked any authority over the development or 
implementation of policies and practices (such as the negotiation of peace 
agreements).125  This was notwithstanding the fact that Ntaganda was in a 
command position over sector commanders and field officers.126  As such, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber deemed the case against Ntaganda inadmissible, and 
the arrest warrant did not issue. 
The Prosecutor appealed this decision, arguing that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber committed an error of law in defining gravity too narrowly for the 
purpose of determining whether to issue an arrest warrant against 
Ntaganda.127  The Appeals Chamber ruled128 as a preliminary matter that an 
admissibility determination was not a pre-requisite to the issuance of an 
arrest warrant.129  Turning to the issue of gravity, the Appeals Chamber 
determined that the Pre-Trial Chamber had erred in its interpretation of 
gravity in several key respects.  First, it noted that imposing requirements 
of systematicity or large-scale action contradicted the guiding threshold 
language of Article 8(1) governing war crimes—which provides for 
jurisdiction only “in particular” when war crimes are committed “as part of 
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes”—
and duplicated aspects of the definition of crimes against humanity, 
requiring a showing that the charged acts were part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population.130  The Appeals Chamber 
also took issue with the concept of “social alarm,” which it noted depends 
on “subjective and contingent reactions” to crimes “rather than upon their 
objective gravity.”131 
                                                           
 124. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest (Feb. 10, 
2006).  At the time the warrant was issued, Lubanga had been in the custody of 
Congolese authorities, who transferred him to the ICC on March 17, 2006, making him 
the first defendant in the custody of the ICC.  His trial commenced in January 2009. 
 125. See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal, ¶¶ 8, 
91, 92 (remanding back to the Pre-Trial Chamber the decision on whether to issue an 
arrest warrant because the Pre-Trial Chamber curtailed its inquiry into Ntaganda, 
believing the case was inadmissible). 
 126. See id. ¶¶ 75-76 (opining that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s announcement that 
perpetrators other than those at the very top are excluded from the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the ICC placed too much emphasis on formalistic grounds). 
 127. Id. ¶ 36. 
 128. See id.  This decision, which is dated 2006, appears to have been reclassified as 
public in April 2008 when the arrest warrant against Ntaganda was unsealed.  See 
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision to Unseal the Warrant of 
Arrest Against Bosco Ntaganda (April 28, 2008). 
 129. See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal, 
¶¶ 41-42 (ruling that Article 58 contains an exhaustive list of factors to consider in 
issuing a warrant for arrest such that admissibility should not be treated as an additional 
substantive pre-requisite); id. ¶ 50 (noting that admissibility determinations should 
involve the accused, which is impossible where they are undertaken in advance of the 
issuance of an arrest warrant). 
 130. Id. ¶¶ 69-71. 
 131. Id. ¶ 72 (explaining that the crimes listed in the governing statute were 
specially selected as the most serious crimes of international concern, and opining that 
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Finally, the Appeals Chamber noted that the deterrent effect of the Court 
will be maximized where all categories of perpetrators may be brought 
before the Court.132  It also noted that “individuals who are not at the very 
top of an organization may still carry considerable influence and commit, 
or generate the widespread commission of, very serious crimes.”133  The 
Court thus reversed the finding of inadmissibility and remanded the case to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to determine on the basis of Article 58(1) alone 
whether an arrest warrant against Ntaganda should issue.134  The Pre-Trial 
Chamber subsequently unsealed an arrest warrant against Ntaganda135 
charging him alongside Lubanga with enlisting, conscripting, and using 
child soldiers in armed conflict.136  In so ruling on the gravity question, the 
Appeals Chamber appropriately refocused this inquiry on qualitative rather 
than quantitative factors, ensured flexibility in pursuing cases, enhanced the 
deterrent power of the Court, and lessened the chances that gravity 
determinations will exclude cases involving sexual violence, even where 
they are committed by low-level perpetrators. 
2. Most Senior Defendants 
Where a prosecutorial strategy focuses on those “most responsible” for 
international crimes—either out of an exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
or pursuant to a tribunal mandate—crimes of sexual violence may present 
particular problems of proof under the applicable doctrines of derivative or 
secondary liability where the senior official or authority may have been 
distant from the physical commission of the crimes.  Where superiors 
ordered their subordinates to commit gender-based crimes, or otherwise 
instigated such crimes,137 the direct liability of superiors for any crimes 
                                                           
subjective criteria are not necessarily appropriate in determining admissibility). 
 132. Id. ¶ 73 (questioning the logic of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s assertion that 
deterrence would be at its zenith when high-level perpetrators are prosecuted and 
alternatively proposing that deterrence is best achieved when there is no such per se 
exclusion on prosecution). 
 133. Id. ¶ 77. 
 134. Id. ¶¶ 91-92. 
 135. See  Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision to Unseal 
the Warrant of Arrest Against Bosco Ntaganda (Apr. 28, 2008). 
 136. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest (Aug. 
22, 2006). 
 137. See Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko & Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR 97-21-I, 
Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 4.2, 7 (Mar. 1, 2001) (indicting Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 
Minister for the Family and for the Advancement of Woman during the genocide in 
Rwanda and a leader in the Hutu-dominated National Republican Movement for 
Democracy and Development Party, for genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, 
public and direct incitement to commit genocide, and various crimes against humanity, 
including rape, pursuant to the doctrine of superior responsibility); see also Peter 
Landesman, A Woman’s Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, (Magazine), at I3. 
Landesman reported that Nyiramasuhuko, who was the first woman to be indicted for 
rape under international law, told her subordinates to rape then kill Tutsi women who 
had sought refuge in a Red Cross camp set up in a local stadium or who had been 
captured.  In particular, she was reported to have said “before you kill the women, you 
need to rape them.”  Id. 
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committed is usually clear.138  By contrast, where superiors are prosecuted 
according to forms of derivative or secondary liability, such as pursuant to 
the doctrines of superior responsibility, linking the defendant to acts of 
sexual violence may raise particular challenges.139 
For example, in addition to proving that the direct perpetrator was a legal 
subordinate under the “effective control” of the accused, the superior 
responsibility doctrine requires a showing that the accused knew, or should 
have known, that his subordinates were committing or were about to 
commit international crimes.140  Difficulties in linking a high-level accused 
to acts of sexual violence arose in cases before the ICTR.  In Akayesu, for 
example, prosecutors claimed that they knew of acts of sexual violence 
perpetrated in the Taba commune where Akayesu served as bourgmeister; 
however they were unable to charge Akayesu for these crimes in the 
absence of evidence of a relationship of subordination between Akayesu 
and the direct perpetrators and additional evidence proving that Akayesu 
knew of the crimes.141  Unsolicited witness testimony during trial finally 
placed Akayesu in the vicinity of where crimes of sexual violence were 
committed, which led to the amendment of his indictment and his ultimate 
                                                           
 138. See Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T, Indictment, ¶¶ 20, 
21, 24, 37-40 (June 20, 2001) (indicting Gacumbitsi, the bourgmestre of Rusumo 
commune, for genocide and crimes against humanity by virtue of ordering, instigating, 
permitting, or failing to prevent or punish his subordinates and others for committing 
rape and other sexual assaults).  But see Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 
2001-64-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 291-293, 321-333 (June 17, 2004) (convicting 
the defendant of genocide and the crime against humanity of rape for instigating some 
of the rapes alleged, but failing to address his superior responsibility liability); 
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
¶¶ 126-138 (July 7, 2006) (addressing the Prosecutor’s unsuccessful appeal of acquittal 
for certain rapes that were proven to have occurred but, in the Trial Chamber’s 
estimation, were not sufficiently linked to the accused to result in a conviction, because 
the rapes in question either occurred prior to the alleged act of instigation or could not 
be causally linked to the alleged act of instigation).  The Appeals Chamber ruled that 
the Trial Chamber erred in not fully considering Gacumbitsi’s superior liability, 
especially given potential de facto superiority over the direct perpetrators in question, 
but found that the evidence did not establish the necessary relationship of 
subordination.  Id. ¶¶ 141-146.  Over dissents by Judges Shahabudeen and Schomburg, 
the Appeals Chamber also confirmed that the defendant could not be convicted of the 
rapes by virtue of his participation in a joint criminal enterprise, because the 
prosecution had not adequately pled this form of responsibility in the indictment or 
cured any defect therein through subsequent submissions. Id. ¶¶ 158-175.  See 
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-A, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen, ¶¶ 28-39 (July 7, 2006) (arguing that the indictment properly plead JCE 
liability); Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-A, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the Appellant for Committing 
Genocide, ¶¶ 7-8, 15 (July 7, 2006) (same). 
 139. See generally Patricia Viseur Sellers, Individual(s’) Liability for Collective 
Sexual Violence, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 153 (Karen Knop ed., 2004) 
(discussing how various doctrines of individual liability have resulted in convictions 
for sexual violence before the ICTY). 
 140. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. S/25704, 
(May 3, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/s25704.htm 
(discussing superior responsibility). 
 141. Cf. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶¶ 49-77 (Sept. 2, 1998) (discussing the various de facto and de jure powers held by the 
town bourgmeister). 
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conviction for aiding and abetting sexual violence.142 
Likewise, in Muvunyi, the prosecution sought to withdraw the rape 
charges altogether a few weeks prior to the start of trial on the grounds that 
witnesses could not be traced and others refused to testify.143  The Trial 
Chamber denied the Prosecutor’s request to withdraw the rape charges on 
the grounds that the Prosecution had not provided sufficient grounds upon 
which to reconsider the confirmation of the original indictment and the 
Defense had already expended time and resources preparing to defend the 
charges.144  Although the Prosecution ultimately located and presented the 
testimony of three rape victims, whose harrowing testimony was deemed 
reliable by the Trial Chamber, none of the witnesses was raped by the 
specific group of subordinates alleged in the indictment.145  Accordingly, 
the defendant was acquitted on these counts.146  Both sides appealed, with 
the prosecutor alleging error in the rape acquittals, among other things.  
With respect to the rape charges, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the 
Trial Chamber that the charges proven did not correspond to the allegations 
in the indictment, and that variances between the evidence adduced at trial 
and the allegations within the indictment remained un-remedied during the 
pre-trial period.147 
Because of difficulties proving superior responsibility, particularly with 
respect to the rigorous “effective control” standard in situations in which 
lines of command and control are blurred or ad hoc,148 prosecutors have 
demonstrated a preference for cases involving direct evidence in more 
recent indictments.  Foregoing superior responsibility charges may insulate 
leaders from sexual violence charges where subordinates committed such 
                                                           
 142. See id. 
 143. See News Release, Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda-ICTR Honeymoon 
Threatens to End over Rape Charges (Feb. 11, 2005), available at  
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDen
iedJustice/hirondelle050210_en.php (recounting the uproar caused by the Prosecutor in 
Rwanda; even Rwanda’s representative to the ICTR criticized the decision); Letter 
from Dr. Alex Obote-Odora, Special Assistant to the Prosecutor, ICTR, to Ariane 
Bruent, Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations (Feb. 11, 2005), 
available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/ 
rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/responseICTRmuvunyi.pdf (explaining and defending the 
decision to withdraw sexual violence counts). 
 144. Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 2000-55A-PT, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 28-34 
(Feb. 23, 2005). 
 145. See Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 2000-55A-PT, Trial Chamber 
Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 409 (Sept. 12, 2006) (stating that “[t]he chamber fully 
understands the unique circumstances of rape victims and sympathizes with them,” but 
that in light of the specific nature of the rape charges in the indictment, the chamber 
could not find Muvyuni responsible beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 146. Id. ¶¶ 400-409. 
 147. Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 2000-55A-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, ¶¶ 160-169 (Aug. 29, 2008). 
 148. See generally Beth Van Schaack, Command Responsibility: The Anatomy of 
Proof in Romagoza v. Garcia, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213 (2003) (discussing the 
challenges inherent in charging superior responsibility). 
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crimes and it cannot be shown that leaders ordered or instigated them.149 
In lieu of superior responsibility, prosecutors (particularly before the 
ICTY) now regularly charge superiors with participating in a joint criminal 
enterprise (JCE) 150 as a way to hold them liable for crimes committed by 
others.151  This has enabled the prosecution of rape and other forms of 
sexual violence that are committed by other individuals.152  The extended 
form of the doctrine has the potential to be particularly useful in charging 
crimes of gender and sexual violence that may not be an express purpose of 
the joint criminal enterprise, but that are otherwise foreseeable under the 
circumstances.153  It is not yet clear under the law whether the requirement 
                                                           
 149. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 144-145 (July 7, 2006) (concluding that the Prosecution was 
unable to show the link necessary between the accused and the specific perpetrators of 
particular incidents of rape, despite the fact that the accused imposed law and order 
over the entire commune and knew or had reason to know of the specific rapes). 
 150. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
¶¶ 220-229 (July 15, 1999) (affirming the cognizability of the joint criminal enterprise 
doctrine).  The law now recognizes three forms of joint criminal enterprise.  For the 
“basic” joint criminal enterprise doctrine, it is necessary to show that the accused 
intended to participate in a common plan aimed at the crime’s commission and 
intended the commission of the crime.  The second (“systemic”) form provides for 
liability for individuals who contribute to the maintenance or essential functions of a 
criminal institution or system, such as a concentration or detention camp.  For the 
“extended” version of the doctrine, which enables the prosecution of crimes that were 
not part of the original common plan, it is necessary to show that the crimes for which 
the accused is being prosecuted were a “natural and foreseeable” consequence of 
implementing the common plan.  The defendant is held liable where he or she willingly 
took the risk that these unintended crimes would be committed during the course of the 
execution of the crimes for which the JCE was formed.  Id.  Many of the original 
indictments before the ICTR did not contain allegations concerning the JCE doctrine, 
because they were issued prior to Tadić.  The ICTR has not allowed prosecutors to rely 
on the doctrine when it is introduced at trial or in closing arguments.  See Prosecutor v. 
Gatete, Case No. ICTR 2000-61-I, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Leave to 
File an Amended Indictment, ¶ 5 (Apr. 21, 2005) (allowing an amended indictment in 
order to better plead the doctrine);  Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, & 
Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Trial Chamber Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 34 
(Feb. 25, 2004) (disallowing ICTR prosecutors from relying on the doctrine when it is 
introduced at trial or in closing arguments). 
 151. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR 2001-65-I, Amended 
Indictment, ¶ 20 (Nov. 27, 2004) (charging defendant with genocide for acts of sexual 
violence either as a superior pursuant to the doctrine of superior responsibility or as a 
member of a joint criminal enterprise where such acts were a foreseeable outcome of 
the objectives and implementation of the JCE, in the absence of allegations that the 
accused participated directly in any of the crimes); see also Prosecutor v. Mpambara, 
Case No. ICTR 2001-65-A, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 28-40 (Sept. 11, 2006).  
Notwithstanding allegations of direct participation, the Prosecution apparently went 
forward on the basis of joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting by omission 
theories of responsibility, at times linking the two.  Id.  The Trial Chamber acquitted 
the defendant.  Id. ¶ 175. 
 152. Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30-T2, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶¶ 307, 319-320 (Nov. 2, 2001) (finding that one of the purposes underlying the 
detention of non-Serbs in Omarska prison camp was the perpetuation of rape and 
forced impregnation); Prosecutor v. Krišjnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgement, ¶¶ 965-966, 972, 1105, 1146, 1150 (Sept. 27, 2006) (noting uncharged 
incidents of sexual violence that were committed pursuant to the implementation of the 
accused’s JCE). 
 153. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Indictment, Rule 50 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 3, 18, 37, 47 (Feb. 13, 2004) (permitting the Prosecutor to 
amend the indictment on the basis of newly discovered evidence and new jurisprudence 
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of foreseeability has any limiting power, or if in a situation of mass 
violence or armed conflict, all international crimes are effectively 
foreseeable.  Certainly, in light of Security Council Resolution 1820 and 
other consistent evidence of the pervasiveness of sexual violence during 
situations of armed conflict, general lawlessness, and repression, it is 
increasingly difficult to argue that sexual violence is not natural or 
foreseeable under these circumstances.154  This is especially true in 
situations in which the common plan involves the detention of women by 
military or paramilitary forces.155 
C. Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining is now a staple of international criminal law, despite 
some initial resistance to the process from civil law practitioners.156  In 
several ICTR cases, the Prosecutor dropped or withdrew sexual violence 
                                                           
on the applicability of the extended notion of joint criminal enterprise to crimes of 
sexual violence); Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-R54, Scheduling 
Order—Oral Arguments on Rape, Complicity in Genocide and the Pleading of a Joint 
Criminal Enterprise in the Amended Indictment (Aug. 8, 2005) (calling for oral 
argument on, among other things, whether the extended form of JCE could be pled as a 
form of liability for a rape charge); Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 
1998-44-I, Amended Indictment of 24 August 2005, ¶¶ 67-70 (Aug. 24, 2005) 
(charging acts of rape, in the new indictment, as the “natural and foreseeable 
consequence of the object of the joint criminal enterprise to destroy the Tutsi group.”); 
Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case Nos. ICTR 98-44-AR72.5 & ICTR 98-44-AR72.6, 
Decision on Jurisdictional Appeals: Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 8 (Apr. 12, 2006) 
(ruling on the defendants’ appeal of other aspects of the Trial Chamber’s JCE ruling, 
but not the doctrine’s applicability to charges of rape); Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., 
Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Motions for Judgment of Acquittal: Rule 98bis of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 40 (Mar. 19, 2008) (allowing the JCE counts 
relating to rape to survive a trial motion for judgment of acquittal). 
 154. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1820, supra note 6, ¶ 3 (noting that during times of armed 
conflict, women and girls are particularly targeted for sexual violence as a tactic of 
war). 
 155. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 616 (Aug. 2, 2001) (ruling that acts of rape and other forms of abuse were not an 
agreed upon objective of the members of the joint criminal enterprise).  The ICTY held 
in Krstić, however, that such acts were a natural and foreseeable consequence of the 
ethnic cleansing campaign, which was the objective of the JCE, in light of the fact that 
the campaign generated a highly vulnerable populace at the mercy of military and 
paramilitary units.  Id. ¶¶ 616-617; see also Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-
98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 327 (finding it inevitable that female detainees 
would be sexually assaulted while in the custody of “men with weapons who were 
often drunk, violent, and physically and mentally abusive and who were allowed to act 
with virtual impunity”).  The Kvočka Trial Chamber found that even where such abuse 
was not inherent to the intended system of persecutory detention and ill treatment, it 
was alternatively a natural or foreseeable consequence of the system.  Id. ¶¶ 325-327.  
See generally Kelly Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related 
Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 
21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288 (2003). 
 156. The ICTR secured an important guilty plea from Jean Kambanda, the former 
Prime Minister of Rwanda.  Kambanda pled guilty to all six counts in the indictment, 
none of which concerned gender-based violence.  See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case 
No. ICTR 97-23-DP, Indictment (Oct. 16, 1997) (indicting defendant for genocide and 
crimes against humanity, but no gender-based crimes).  It is unclear if he was ever 
asked to plea to the acts of sexual violence in Rwanda.  See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, 
Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S (Sept. 4, 1998) (recounting 
substance of plea). 
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counts where the defendant pled guilty on other counts.  For example, the 
prosecution had charged Omar Serushago with various acts of rape as the 
predicate acts of genocide and as crimes against humanity.157  The 
defendant subsequently pled guilty to four out of five counts, excluding the 
rape as a crime against humanity count.  The prosecutor subsequently 
withdrew the rape charge.158  Although rape had been charged as a 
predicate of genocide, none of the facts to which Serushago admitted 
related to the rape allegations.159  Indeed, several cases manifested the same 
pattern in which defendants plead guilty to murder and extermination, but 
refuse to accept responsibility for sexual violence charges.160 
D. Failing to Make Testimony of Victims Trial Ready 
Even where cases are investigated and charges are brought, shoddy 
prosecutorial preparation and ill-prepared testimony can result in acquittals.  
At one point, more than half of the ICTR indictments included charges of 
rape and other forms of sexual violence (many involving counts added by 
amendment).161  Many cases, however, ended in acquittal on the rape and 
sexual violence counts.  For example, in Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, the 
defendant was acquitted of rape (charged as a crime against humanity) 
because two of the judges found that the key witness lacked credibility due 
to inconsistencies in her testimony at trial and prior statements to 
investigators.162  The Trial Chamber thus acquitted the defendant of rapes 
                                                           
 157. See Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR 98-39-I, Modified Indictment, 
¶¶ 4.22, 5.11-12, 5.25-27 (Oct. 8, 1998) (indicting Serushago for crimes committed by 
him personally, by persons he supervised, or by his confederates, with his knowledge 
and consent, including rape and sexual assault of Tutsi women and girls). 
 158. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. 98-39-S, Trial Chamber Sentence, ¶ 4 
(Feb. 5, 1999). 
 159. Id. ¶ 25; see also Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR 98-39-A, Reasons 
for Judgment, ¶¶ 1, 34 (Apr. 6, 2000) (affirming the Trial Chamber’s sentence of 
fifteen years imprisonment). 
 160. See Prosecutor v. Nzabirinda, Case No. ICTR 2001-77-T, Trial Chamber 
Sentencing Judgment (Feb. 23, 2007).  The original December 2001 indictment against 
Nzabirinda contained charges, among others, of rape as a crime against humanity.  On 
November 20, 2006, the prosecutor requested the withdrawal of the majority of the 
counts, with prejudice, and submitted an amended indictment that contained only one 
count of murder as a crime against humanity.  Several weeks later, the defendant pled 
guilty to the single count.  Id. ¶¶ 7, 41.  The prosecutor apparently explained the 
withdrawal on the ground that “the evidence is not there.”  Id. ¶ 44; see also Prosecutor 
v. Rugambarara, Case No. ICTR 2000-59-I, Decision on the Prosecution Motion to 
Amend the Indictment, ¶ 2 (June 28, 2007) (noting abandonment of genocide and other 
crimes against humanity charges (including torture and rape) in favor of a single count 
of extermination as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No. 
ICTR 00-60-T, Trial Chamber Judgment & Sentence, ¶¶ 7, 12 (Apr. 13, 2006) (noting 
that prosecution withdrew rape and other charges contained in the original indictment 
dated July 1, 2000).  In October 2005, defendant pled guilty to remaining counts of 
murder and extermination.  Id. 
 161. See Sita Balthazar, Gender Crimes and the International Criminal Tribunals, 
10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 43, 43 (2006). 
 162. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Trial Chamber Judgment & 
Sentence, ¶ 924 (Dec. 1, 2003) (acquitting the accused of individual responsibility for 
various rape charges either because he was not present at the incident, did not 
specifically order his subordinates to rape, and neither knew nor could have known that 
rapes were being committed by the Interahamwe). 
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that were proven to have occurred.163  In a strong dissent, Judge Arlette 
Ramaroson argued that the inconsistencies were not due to a lack of 
credibility but to an incompetent investigation.164  Later, the Prosecution 
missed a deadline to appeal the acquittal.  Its untimely motion to allow the 
appeal was rejected by the Appeals Chamber for lack of good cause.165 
                                                           
 163. Id. ¶¶ 917-925 (recounting three instances of rape, including one of a young, 
handicapped Tutsi, for which the accused was found not guilty). 
 164. See Prosecutor v. Kajeljeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Arlette Ramaroson,  ¶¶ 26-28, 36 (dissenting from the Trial Chamber judgment 
and proposing that witness GDO’s trial testimony should have been considered rather 
than her written statements given earlier to ICTR investigators, especially in light of the 
fact that she was illiterate; incapable of estimating in meters; and the rape took place in 
a forest where visibility and hearing were difficult). 
 165. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, Decision on Prosecution 
Urgent Motion for Acceptance of Prosecution Notice of Appeal Out of Time 
(Jan. 23, 2004). 
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Other acquittals for rape occurred in the cases against Niyitegeka,166 
Muvunyi,167 and Kamuhanda,168 primarily because the prosecutor failed to 
meet the required burden of proof.  The prosecution did not appeal many of 
these acquittals.  In other cases, such as with respect to defendant 
Ndindabahizi,169 the prosecution withdrew sexual violence counts in 
advance of trial where supporting evidence was determined to be 
unavailable or unavailing.  Likewise, in Mpambara, the prosecution 
conceded that it had offered no evidence in relation to the rape allegations 
in the indictment, so the ICTR ruled that the defendant had no case to 
answer with respect to those allegations.170 
Consistent with their age, health, experience with the legal process, and 
so on, victims and witnesses must be properly prepared to give their 
testimony.  At all times, investigators, prosecutors, and other personnel 
must be trained to handle witnesses with respect and sensitivity.171  
Preparing witnesses to testify in advance of trial has been expressly 
condoned by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR.  In Karemera, one of the 
defendants sought an order from the Trial Chamber preventing the 
Prosecution from “proofing” its witnesses prior to their giving testimony.172  
Rejecting the motion, the Trial Chamber sanctioned the practice under the 
following conditions: 
Provided that it does not amount to the manipulation of a witness’ 
evidence, this practice may encompass preparing and familiarizing a 
                                                           
 166. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-T, Trial Chamber Judgment & 
Sentence, ¶¶ 301, 455-458 (May 16, 2003) (acquitting defendant of rape charges (pled 
as a crime against humanity) for insufficient evidence with respect to one victim and 
where the prosecution brought no other evidence that the accused “did cause women to 
be raped,” as alleged in the indictment).  The defendant was, however, convicted of the 
commission of “other inhumane acts” for ordering Interahamwe members to undress a 
dead woman and insert a piece of wood into her vagina.  Id. ¶¶ 7.2, 316, 463-467.  He 
was also present when his co-attackers killed and castrated a prominent Tutsi.  Id. 
¶¶ 463-467; see also Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 46 (July 9, 2004) (denying an appeal of rape charges). 
 167. See supra text accompanying note 146. 
 168. See Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR 95-54A-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment (Jan. 22, 2004) (acquitting the defendant and his co-attackers of rape because 
although witnesses heard that at least one of twenty abducted girls had been raped, 
there was no direct evidence to this effect).  In Kamuhanda, the rape charges survived a 
motion for acquittal, but the defendant was ultimately acquitted because all of the 
evidence in the record of his involvement in rape constituted hearsay.  The prosecutor 
did not appeal.  See Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment (Sept. 19, 2005) (setting forth defendant’s grounds of appeal). 
 169. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR 2001-71-I, Trial Chamber 
Judgment (July 15, 2004).  In October 2001, the judge who confirmed the original 
indictment granted leave to the Prosecution to amend the charges to allege the 
commission of rape as a crime against humanity.  Id. ¶ 9.  In June 2003, however, the 
Trial Chamber granted leave to withdraw the rape counts.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 170. Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR 2001-65-T, Decision on the 
Defence’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, ¶ 7 (Oct. 21, 2005). 
 171. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13 (noting that rape victims may be uncomfortable 
with or unprepared to answer detailed questions about what was done to them 
physically). 
 172. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73.8, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, ¶ 3 (May 11, 2007). 
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witness with the proceedings before the Tribunal, comparing prior 
statements made by a witness, detecting differences and inconsistencies 
in recollection of the witness, allowing a witness to refresh his or her 
memory in respect of the evidence he or she will give, and inquiring and 
disclosing to the Defence additional information and/or evidence of 
incriminatory or exculpatory nature in sufficient time prior to the 
witness’ testimony.173 
The Appeals Chamber affirmed,174 noting that in the absence of an 
express rule on point, Rule 89(B) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence generally confers discretion on the Trial Chamber to apply “rules 
of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before 
it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles 
of law.”175  Indeed, a survey of national law revealed wide variations in 
witness preparation practices, suggesting the absence of a general principle 
of law and no consensus that the practice is inherently unethical or 
prejudicial to the accused.176  The Appeals Chamber noted that the 
defendant is free to explore issues of witness coaching or manipulation on 
cross-examination.177 
A Trial Chamber of the ICC has taken the opposite approach,178 raising 
concerns with respect to witness preparation in general and with the 
prosecution of gender crimes in particular.  In the Lubanga case, the Pre-
Trial Chamber specifically prohibited the Prosecution from proofing its 
witnesses on the ground that the Prosecution had failed to show that the 
practice of witness proofing is a widely accepted practice in international 
criminal law, which would enable it to be considered part of the applicable 
law of the Court pursuant to Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute.179  The 
                                                           
 173. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Defence 
Motions to Prohibit Witness Proofing, Rule 73 of the Rules and Procedure of Evidence, 
¶ 15 (Dec. 15, 2006). 
 174. See Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73.8, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, ¶¶ 14-15; see also Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., 
Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution Practice of “Proofing” Witnesses, Case 
No. IT-03-66-T (Dec. 10, 2004) (upholding the practice of witness proofing before the 
ICTY); Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL 04-15-T, Decision on the Gbao and 
Sesay Joint Application for the Exclusion of the Testimony of Witness TF1-141, ¶ 33 
(Oct. 26, 2005) (finding that “proofing witnesses prior to their testimony in court is a 
legitimate practice that serves the interests of justice . . . especially so given the 
particular circumstances of many of the witnesses in this trial who are testifying about 
traumatic events in an environment that can be entirely foreign and intimidating for 
them”). 
 175. Karamera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73.8, Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, ¶ 8. 
 176. See id. ¶ 11 (noting further that witness proofing is not incompatible with the 
Tribunal’s Statute and Rules). 
 177. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. 
 178. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Practices 
of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, ¶ 42 (Nov. 8, 2006) (stating that if 
any general principle of law could be drawn from a survey of the national laws of the 
world’s various legal systems, witness proofing would be prohibited). 
 179. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 21(1) (summarizing the applicable laws 
that the Court may apply, ranging from the Rome Statute itself to the general principles 
of law derived by national courts). 
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Trial Chamber adopted an inquisitorial perspective and reasoned that 
witnesses “belong” to neither the Prosecution nor the Defense, but rather 
are witnesses of the Court.180  The Trial Chamber affirmed the decision on 
reconsideration, noting that the ICC’s procedures differ markedly in a 
number of ways from the procedural regimes of the ad hoc tribunals.181  It 
determined that while it may be appropriate for a witness to review his or 
her prior statements, there should be no discussion of the topics to be dealt 
with in court that might result in a “rehearsal” of trial testimony.182  As it 
now stands before the ICC, the general familiarization with the courtroom 
and its proceedings are to be conducted by the Registry rather than either 
party.183 
The ICTR approach seems the better one in the context of international 
criminal law, where trials may happen years from the events in question, 
rely heavily on oral testimony, and involve traumatized witnesses with little 
experience with legal institutions or processes.  Allowing both parties to 
meet with witnesses in advance of their testimony can enable witnesses to 
refresh their recollections of events; review any prior statements; fully 
identify relevant facts (including exculpatory evidence); work on 
presenting their evidence in a more complete, orderly, and structured 
manner; and prepare for cross-examination.184  Having witnesses take the 
stand “cold” threatens to render them unprepared to testify effectively 
before the Court.  It may also re-traumatize victim witnesses during cross-
examination or discredit them where their testimony is stilted or confused 
or diverges from statements that may have been taken years prior.185 
The witness proofing ruling may also disparately impact women and 
particularly victims of sexual violence.  Such victims may find it difficult 
to testify about what happened to them without the benefit of some prior 
preparation so they are not surprised or insulted by sensitive or seemingly 
invasive questions.  Without the benefit of witness proofing, it will be 
crucial for the ICC judges to manage the trial process to insure that 
witnesses are not cross-examined so aggressively, by either side, that they 
are re-traumatized.  Allowing ill-prepared witnesses to undergo this 
treatment would undermine the rehabilitative potential of participating in a 
                                                           
 180. See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Practices of Witness 
Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, ¶ 26. 
 181. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Regarding the 
Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, 
¶ 45 (Nov. 30, 2007) (opining that the procedural framework of the Rome Statute is 
independent from the ad hoc procedures in preparing witnesses for trial). 
 182. Id. ¶ 51. 
 183. Id. ¶ 22. 
 184. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Defence 
Motions to Prohibit Witness Proofing: Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
¶ 15 (Dec. 15, 2006). 
 185. See generally B. Don Taylor, Witness Proofing in International Criminal Law: 
Is Widening Procedural Divergence in International Criminal Tribunals a Cause for 
Concern? (2008), http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2008/Taylor.pdf (questioning the 
desirability of the “widening procedural divergence” between the ad hoc tribunals and 
the ICC). 
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justice process. 
E. Safeguarding the Rights and Safety of Victims and Witnesses 
In addition to all the logistical impediments to investigating and proving 
gender crimes, the prosecutor must be able to ensure the effective 
participation and safety of victims and witnesses.  There are a whole host 
of procedural protections and mechanisms that courts and prosecutors can 
utilize to ensure that victims are not alienated, re-traumatized, or 
endangered by their participation in trial,186 including rape shield laws,187 
opportunities to testify anonymously or confidentially (e.g., through face 
and voice distortion), written statements in lieu of oral testimony,188 
pursuing the in camera presentation of evidence, the taking of evidence by 
electronic means (such as closed-circuit television), expunging identifying 
information from public materials, witness relocation programs, etc.189  It 
should not be necessary for a victim or witness to demonstrate an imminent 
threat before these mechanisms are used.  Prior to giving their testimony, 
victims must fully understand what the testimonial process will entail, what 
protective measures are available to them, and what limitations on such 
measures exist so that they can make an informed decision about 
participating.  In implementing these measures, the prosecutor must 
continually coordinate with the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the 
particular tribunal (which is often housed in the Registry) to ensure their 
effectiveness.  Ideally, the prosecutor would also offer victims and 
                                                           
 186. See generally ANNE-MARIE L.M. DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY AND 
THE ICTR 231-82 (2005) (detailing the rationale and the form of ICC protective 
measures available to safeguard victims who appear as witnesses). 
 187. See RULES AND PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, R. 96, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1 (as amended Mar. 14, 2008) 
[hereinafter ICTR Rules] (containing a rape shield provision that provides that no 
witness corroboration is required in the face of testimony about sexual violence, 
consent is not a defense except in limited circumstances, and no evidence of prior 
sexual conduct of the victims may be introduced); see also RULES OF PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, R. 70, 71, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 
2002) (embodying similar rape shield provisions applicable to the ICC). 
 188. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on 
Reconsideration of Admission of Written Statements in Lieu of Oral Testimony and 
Admission of the Testimony of Prosecution Witness Gay, ¶ 13 (Sept. 28, 2007) 
(allowing certain written statements regarding sexual violence to be admitted into 
evidence).  But see Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 1998-44-T, Decision 
on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Evidence of Rape and Sexual Assault 
Pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the Rules; and Order for Reduction of Prosecution Witness 
List, ¶ 20 (Dec. 11, 2006) (ruling that evidence of witnesses of rape must be submitted 
orally, because the allegations were “so pivotal to the Prosecution’s case that it would 
be unfair to the Accused to permit the evidence to be given in written form without an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses”). 
 189. See, ICTR Rules, supra note 187, R. 69(A) (allowing a judge to order the non-
disclosure of a witness’s identity to the defendant in pre-trial proceedings); id. 
R. 75(A)-(B) (allowing for a number of measures to ensure a witness’s privacy and 
protection, such as in camera proceedings, so long as “the measures are consistent with 
the rights of the accused”); see also Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 68(1) (recognizing 
similar concerns for the “safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity, and 
privacy of victims and witnesses”). 
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witnesses referrals to health services and psychological counseling prior, 
during, and after testifying, if necessary.190 
Although these procedural protections are available in the ICTR, they 
have not been fully used in all cases.  The identities of protected witnesses 
have been publically revealed and witnesses have been harassed and 
threatened after returning to Rwanda following their testimony.191  One 
report indicated that the overwhelming sentiments expressed by rape 
survivors in Rwanda about their experience with the ICTR were “burning 
anger, deep frustration, dashed hopes, indignation and even resignation.”192  
Research with rape victims reveals that participation in ICTR proceedings 
has had the effect of exacerbating, rather than relieving victims’ 
suffering.193 
In their interactions with victims and witnesses, prosecutors need not act 
alone.  In addition to the Victims and Witness Unit of the tribunal, 
prosecutors can connect with civil society organizations in situ that are 
dedicated to supporting victims of gender crimes and to promoting gender 
justice.194  These groups can help surface instances of gender violence, 
empower victims to come forward, and facilitate investigations.195  Such 
groups can act as liaisons or conduits between the prosecution and victims 
and also help to provide the necessary financial, logistical, psychological, 
and social support for victims undertaking the difficult process of testifying 
against perpetrators.196  Once legal proceedings are concluded, these groups 
can facilitate the reintegration of victims into society.  Notwithstanding the 
value of such relationships, external relations emerge as a perennial 
weakness in the international justice system, in which the tribunal staff are 
over-extended and outreach is considered a dispensable luxury.197  Indeed, 
in what has been described as a “witness crisis,”198 several victims’ groups 
                                                           
 190. See Wood, supra note 11, at 322-23. 
 191. See Jefferson, supra note 19 (noting that the threats and harassment extend to 
the families of the victims as well and that improved mechanisms for protection are 
crucial to encourage the victims to testify at trial). 
 192. NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 4. 
 193. See id. (explaining that the Rwandan rape victims desire an environment in the 
ICTR that treats them with the utmost respect and care at all stages of the legal process 
and allows for a public record of the crimes of sexual violence committed against 
them). 
 194. See David Backer, Civil Society and Transitional Justice, 2 HUM. RTS. J. 297, 
300-02 (2003) (enumerating the factors that affect the involvement of civil society—
including non-state actors, NGOs, and civic associations—in the transitional justice 
process). 
 195. See id. at 302 (noting the role that civil society organizations play in compiling 
data and reporting abuses). 
 196. See id. at 304 (highlighting specific examples of services such as victim-
perpetrator mediation, memorials, public gatherings, medical care, and training and 
educational programs). 
 197. See generally CHRISTOPHER KEITH HALL, SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT PROSECUTORIAL POLICY AND STRATEGY AND 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS (2003). 
 198. See Wood, supra note 11, at 300 (opining that the competing interests between 
the needs of legal justice and the victim’s interests impedes the function of the ICTR). 
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in Rwanda eventually cut off all cooperation with the Tribunal after 
repeated frustrating experiences.199 
III. CONCLUSION 
As a result of these outcomes, only a handful of defendants have been 
found guilty of gender crimes, including Akayesu,200 Gacumbitsi,201 
Semanza,202 and Muhimana.203  The history and the practice of the ICTR 
vis-à-vis gender justice provide valuable negative lessons for the ICC.  As a 
result of the relentless work of advocates for gender justice during the 
multilateral drafting of the ICC Statute, that treaty is not only characterized 
by gender inclusiveness in its substantive law, but also in its structures and 
procedures.204  In particular, the ICC Statute contains an expansive list of 
gender crimes as war crimes and crimes against humanity, rendering it the 
most progressive articulation of gender-based international criminal law in 
history.205  Gender is listed as a ground—like ethnicity or race—on which 
                                                           
 199. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 5 (reporting that rather than punishment and 
vengeance, Rwandan women wanted the ICTR to acknowledge their traumatic 
experience and condemn the violence committed against them). 
 200. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment 
(June 1, 2001). 
 201. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T, Trial Chamber Judgment 
(June 17, 2004). 
 202. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Trial Chamber Judgment and 
Sentence (May 15, 2003). 
 203. See Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR 95-1B-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment & Sentence, ¶¶ 534-563 (Apr. 28, 2005) (convicting the defendant of 
committing or abetting many of the rapes alleged, but finding that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s involvement in others), rev’d in part 
Case No. ICTR 95-1B-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 46-53 (May 21, 1997) 
(reversing the findings of criminal responsibility for two specific rapes where it was 
unclear whether it was the defendant or someone else who had raped the women in 
question, but affirming the finding of guilt for crimes against humanity with respect to 
other acts of rape).  Two judges dissented from the rape acquittals, arguing that it was 
open to the Trial Chamber to find that it was the defendant who raped the women.  See 
Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR 95-1B-A, Jointly Partly Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Schomburg (May 21, 1997). 
 204. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (July 12, 1993) 
(reflecting the calls by NGOs and the United Nations for the integration of a gender 
perspective into all aspects of the human rights system and for a focus on 
accountability for violence against women); see also World Conference on Human 
Rights, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994). 
 205. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi) (enumerating the 
crimes of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, and other forms of sexual violence as war crimes whether committed in 
international or non-international armed conflict); see also id. art. 7(1)(g) (listing the 
same set of crimes as crimes against humanity).  Forced pregnancy is defined to mean 
“the unlawful confinement, of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of 
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave 
violations of international law.”  Id. art. 7(2)(f).  This language served as a last minute 
compromise to placate delegations, most notably the Vatican and Ireland, who feared 
that a reference to forced pregnancy would implicate national anti-abortion policies.  
See Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 2, at 74.  Enslavement as a crime against 
humanity is also defined with reference to the trafficking of women and children.  See 
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(2)(c).  In addition, acts of gender violence can also 
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an individual or collective may be persecuted.206  With respect to the 
possibility of charging genocidal rape, the definition of genocide in Article 
6 mirrors that of the Genocide Convention.207  The Elements of Crimes—
drafted to assist the ICC in interpreting its substantive offenses—note that 
serious bodily or mental harm “may include, but is not necessarily 
restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading 
treatment,”208 thus laying the foundation for future prosecutions of 
genocidal rape before the ICC.  The ICC Statute also contains a non-
discrimination provision stating that the ICC’s “application and 
interpretation” of the law must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights and be without adverse distinction founded on, 
inter alia, gender.209  A number of procedural protections exist for victims 
and witnesses.210 
In terms of personnel, the Statute requires State parties to choose judges 
and other staff with experience with “violence against women or 
children”211 and calls for “fair representation of female and male judges.”212  
The gender composition of the Court approaches parity in several 
departments. Of the eighteen ICC judges, nine are now women.213  This 
compares favorably to other international courts, whose composition is 
heavily dominated by men.214  Forty-eight percent of professional positions 
are now held by women; however, women are concentrated in the lower 
                                                           
be charged as the war crime of “committing outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”  Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxi) (defining serious 
violations of the laws and customs within the international armed conflicts); id. art. 
8(2)(c)(ii) (outlining the same violations of the laws and customs of war within non-
international armed conflicts). 
 206. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(1)(h), 7(2)(g) (encompassing the 
“intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law 
by reason of the identity of the group of collectivity”).  Before the ICC, however, 
persecution is not a fully autonomous crime; rather, it may only be prosecuted where it 
is connected to another crime against humanity or crime within the Rome Statute.  Id. 
art. 7(1)(h). 
 207. See id. art. 6(a)-(b), 6(b)(1) n.3 (defining “genocide” to mean various acts 
“committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or 
religious group . . .”); see also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 A (III), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 9, 1948). 
 208. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 65, art. 6(b). 
 209. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 2(3). 
 210. See id. arts. 53-85 (promulgating the procedures for investigation, prosecution, 
trial sentencing, and appeal).  In addition, victims are entitled to counsel before the ICC 
and may receive reparations from defendants (art. 75) or from a trust fund (arts. 79).  
Id. art. 75(2), 79(2). 
 211. See id. arts. 36(8) (judges), 42(9) (prosecutor), & 43(6) (trauma experts in 
Victims and Witnesses Unit). 
 212. Id. art. 36(8)(iii). 
 213. See The Judges–Biographical Notes (last visited Jan. 28, 2009), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Chambers/. 
 214. See Cherie Booth, Prospects and Issues for the International Criminal Court: 
Lessons From Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE 
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 157, 162 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003) 
(citing studies conducted of international courts, currently numbering over thirty, which 
revealed that the vast majority of international judges are male). 
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professional grades.215  The largest gender gap is found in the Office of the 
Prosecutor, which boasts only forty-two percent women.216 
So far, the ICC prosecutor is actively prosecuting crimes of gender 
violence in most cases.217  Within the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) situation, both Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui have 
been indicted for crimes against humanity and war crimes for the 
commission of sexual slavery, rape, and outrages upon personal dignity.218  
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, a citizen of the DRC who is implicated for his 
involvement in crimes within the Central African Republic (CAR), will 
likely be prosecuted for rape as a crime against humanity and a war 
crime.219  Several Ugandan defendants are to be prosecuted for crimes of 
sexual violence: sexual enslavement as a crime against humanity and rape 
as a war crime or a crime against humanity.220  Both outstanding Darfur 
                                                           
 215. WOMEN’S INITIATIVE FOR GENDER JUSTICE, ADVANCE PRELIMINARY REPORT–
STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 6 (2009), available at http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/Advance_ 
Preliminary_Report-Web_Final.pdf. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, MAKING A STATEMENT: A 
REVIEW OF CHARGES AND PROSECUTIONS FOR GENDER-BASED CRIMES BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 8-9 (2008), available at http://www.iccwomen.org/ 
publications/articles/docs/MakingAStatement-Web_Final.pdf (discussing the existing 
and potential gender violence charges and debrying lack of gender violence charges in 
Lubanga); see also Oosterveld, supra note 18, at 128 (noting stronger gender violence 
policies within the ICC prosecutorial office).   
 218. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 1-60 (Sept. 30, 2008).  In connection with the 
confirmation of the indictment against the two defendants, the Prosecutor requested 
protective measures from the Registry for two witnesses whose testimony was relevant 
to the sexual violence counts.  The request was, however, rejected by the Registrar.  
Nonetheless, the Prosecutor himself arranged for the preventative relocation of two 
witnesses for their safety without authorization, citing his obligations to ensure the 
security of witnesses under Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute.  Id. ¶ 167; see also 
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Corrigendum to the 
Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventative Relocation 
and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, ¶¶ 18-26 
(Apr. 25, 2008) (detailing the lack of authority for prosecutorial action).  At the 
confirmation hearing, the Court ruled that even redacted or summary versions of the 
witnesses’ testimony could not be admitted into evidence, because the witnesses were 
in effect “unprotected” and thus at risk.  Eventually, the witnesses were relocated by 
the Registrar, which opened the way for their evidence to be considered and for the 
reintroduction of the sexual violence charges.  See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Applications for Leave to Appeal the Decision 
on the Admission of the Evidence of Witnesses 132 and 287 and on the Leave to 
Appeal on the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 11 (Oct. 24, 2008).  The 
defendants’ request to appeal these decisions was rejected.  Id. at 18. 
 219. See Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Warrant of Arrest 
against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Replacing the Warrant of Arrest Issued on 23 May 
2008, ¶¶ 17-18 (June 10, 2008). 
 220. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for 
Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as amended on 27 September 2005, ¶ 42 (Sept. 27, 
2005).  Contra Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02-04 Warrant of Arrest for Okot 
Odhiambo (July 8, 2005) (excluding sexual violence charges in the warrant against 
Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen).  Two Ugandan defendants, Vincent Otti and 
Raska Lukwiya, have since died.  See Uganda Rebels Drop Truce Demand, BBC 
NEWS, Aug. 14, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4790049.stm (confirming the 
death of Vincent Otti in late 2007). 
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arrest warrants include gender violence counts (viz. rape, outrages upon 
personal dignity, and persecutory gender violence).221  In addition, the 
prosecutor has sought an indictment against Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir that features charges of gender violence, including rape as a 
predicate act of genocide.  Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo also 
appointed feminist law professor Catherine MacKinnon as a dedicated 
Gender Advisor,222 although the Court has yet to appoint a Gender Legal 
Advisor for the entire institution. 
The practice of the ICTR reveals that without a comprehensive 
commitment to prosecuting gender crimes, defendants will enjoy effective 
immunity for acts of gender violence, women will be systematically denied 
justice, the trial record will not provide a definitive history of the full 
reality of violence in the region in question, the expressive capacity of the 
law will be undermined, and the system of international criminal law will 
send a message that gender violence is not as serious or pervasive as other 
forms of assault and mayhem.  Over time, the perception of selective 
justice will undermine the legitimacy of international criminal law and its 
institutions as well as support for prosecutions within impacted 
communities.223  In addition, the Security Council has confirmed in 
Resolution 1820 that failing to prosecute crimes of gender violence 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.224  In that 
Resolution, the Security Council stressed the importance of ending 
impunity for such acts and ensuring women and children equal protection 
under the law and equal access to justice.225  To this end, the Council called 
on states to exclude sexual violence crimes from any amnesty provisions 
promulgated in conflict resolution processes.  By recognizing that acts of 
sexual violence are serious, exacerbate armed conflict, and are often the 
result of a deliberate policy to subjugate an entire enemy community, 
Resolution 1820 helps to counter arguments that sexual violence is a 
private or peripheral matter, unconnected to public events of international 
importance.226  With the implementation of the Security Council-mandated 
                                                           
 221. See Prosecutor v. Harun & Adb-al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, 
Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb, 6-16 (Apr. 27, 2007) (charging acts of rape as 
crimes against humanity and war crimes); Prosecutor v. Harun & Abd-al-Rahman, 
Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun, 6-15 (Apr. 27, 2007) 
(charging the same set of crimes as Ali Kushayb); see also Prosecutor v. Harun & Abd-
al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Application under 
Article 58(7) of the Statute (Apr. 27, 2007). 
 222. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Appoints Prof. 
Catharine A. MacKinnon as Special Adviser on Gender Crimes (Nov. 26, 2008), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/450.html. 
 223. Wood, supra note 11, at 299-300 (noting that the ICTR’s legacy of lack of 
gender justice will impact the perception of the legitimacy of the Tribunal in the eyes 
of the Rwandan public). 
 224. S.C. Res. 1820, supra note 6, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008). 
 225. Id. ¶ 4. 
 226. See id. (recognizing that sexual violence may be charged as “a war crime, a 
crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide” that implicates 
international security concerns). 
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Completion Strategy, it is largely too late for Rwanda’s women to enjoy 
gender justice.  The ICC must do better for the rest of Africa’s women. 
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